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Abstract
The ICTY was established as a criminal tribunal that would conduct prosecutions 
and trials addressing international crimes committed in the former Yugoslavia 
during the wars in the 1990s. Next to this core mandate, the Tribunal 
increasingly placed itself in the context of rule of law promotion, the trigger 
being its completion strategy and the insertion of Rule11bis into its Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence. Rule 11bis foresaw the possibility to refer cases from 
The Hague to national courts. In order to help prepare national justice systems 
for receiving these cases, the ICTY initiated a number of rule of law promotion 
measures, albeit without having officially defined the ‘rule of law’ for itself, let 
alone having formulated a policy for systematic rule of law promotion. Based on 
a comprehensive case law, discourse, and document analysis, this contribution, 
however, puts together a mosaic of rule of law elements recommended by 
the ICTY, effectively resembling a definition. This definition has a normative 
dimension that concerns the legislative framework of a country, an institutional 
dimension that prescribes rules for the functioning of its justice institutions, and 
a cultural dimension, requiring that the rule of law be ideologically embraced by 
people and State representatives. As the ICTY’s rule of law promotion activities 
reflect what it deemed relevant in the rule of law at the respective time, it 
becomes clear that the Tribunal took this definition as a basis for its efforts in 
the countries of the former Yugoslavia. Three examples will demonstrate this. 
Overall, this piece contributes to understanding the legal and normative bases 
of the ICTY’s efforts at strengthening the rule of law in post-conflict former 
Yugoslavia.
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A. The ICTY as a Rule of Law Promoter
The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY 
or Tribunal) was established by the United Nations Security Council in 
1993 in the middle of the Balkan wars. Ever since, it has been asserted that 
the ICTY “instill[ed]”1, “re-establish[ed]”2, “advance[ed]”3, “enhance[d]”4, 
“strengthen[ed]”5, “improve[ed]”6, “shap[ed]”7, “embrace[d]”8, “promot[ed]”9 
(this list could go on for pages) the rule of law in the countries under its 
jurisdiction. At first, these claims are surprising as promotion of the rule of 
law is not defined as an element of the Tribunal’s mandate – neither in the 
legal documents regulating its work, nor in the UN Security Council resolution 
that founded the ICTY.10 While in that resolution, the UN Security Council 
proclaimed as goals to prosecute violations of international humanitarian law, to 
1  P. Akhavan, ‘Justice in the Hague, Peace in the Former Yugoslavia?: A Commentary on 
the United Nationals War Crimes Tribunal’, 20 Human Rights Quaterly (1998) 4, 737, 
749.
2  United Nations Secretary-General, The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict 
and Post-Conflict Societies: Report of the Secretary-General, UN Doc S/2004/616, 3 August 
2004, 13.
3  J. Hagan & S. K. Ivković, ‘War Crimes, Democracy, and the Rule of Law in Belgrade, the 
Former Yugoslavia, and Beyond’, 605 The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political 
and Social Science (2006) 1, 129, 130.
4  J. Stromseth, ‘Justice on the Ground:  Can International Criminal Courts Strengthen 
Domestic Rule of Law in Post-Conflict Societies?’, 1 Hague Journal on the Rule of Law 
(2009) 1, 87, 88.
5  ICTY, Achievements, available at http://www.icty.org/sid/324 (last visited 10 December 
2018); D. F. Orentlicher, Shrinking the Space for Denial: The Impact of the ICTY in Serbia 
(2008), 42.
6  P. C. McMahon & J. L. Miller, ‘From Adjudication to Aftermath: Assessing the ICTY’s 
Goals beyond Prosecution’, 13 Human Rights Review (2012) 4, 421, 422-423.
7  E. Simpson, ‘Stop to the Hague:  Internal versus External Factors Suppressing the 
Advancement of the Rule of Law in Serbia’, 36 Georgetown Journal of International Law 
(2004) 4, 1255, 1257.
8  Stromseth, ‘Justice on the Ground’, supra note 4, 87.
9  L. A. Barria & S. D. Roper, ‘Judicial Capacity Building in Bosnia and Herzegovina: 
Understanding Legal Reform Beyond the Completion Strategy of the ICTY’, 9 Human 
Rights Review (2008) 3, 317, 319 [Barria & Roper, Judicial Capacity Building in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina].
10  Although some commentators argue that the UN Security Council hoped the ICTY 
would contribute to the establishment of the rule of law in the countries under its 
jurisdiction. See for instance: Judge Fausto Pocar in Frédéric Mégret, ‘The Legacy of 
the ICTY as Seen through Some of Its Actors and Observers’, 3 Goettingen Journal of 
International Law (2011) 3, 1011, 1030.
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deter future crimes, and to restore and maintain peace,11 it defined the ICTY’s 
core competence as “to prosecute persons responsible for serious violations 
of international humanitarian law committed in the territory of the former 
Yugoslavia since 1991” in Article 1 of the Tribunal’s Statute.
As time went by, however, the ICTY began to place itself in the context of 
rule of law promotion. At least with the adoption of the Tribunal’s “completion 
strategy”, designed to gradually wind down the Tribunal by 2010,12 rule of 
law promotion had come to the forefront.13 ICTY representatives increasingly 
mentioned it as a goal, or even as a task. It is unlikely that statements to that 
effect were always carefully thought through, or even less, that they were based 
on a clear definition of the ‘rule of law’ or on an appreciation of how exactly the 
Tribunal contributed to the rule of law. Although the ICTY did take a few active 
and conscious steps in that regard, overall, its role in rule of law promotion 
was more a side-effect to its core mandate of prosecuting war criminals. As 
John Hocking, the last ICTY Registrar, observed with regard to the Tribunal’s 
legacy: “I […] see a larger impact, a spill over effect in the strengthening in 
the rule of law, even beyond our direct or intended efforts.”14 Hence, when 
reviewing individual statements about the ICTY’s effect on the rule of law, it is 
often difficult to grasp what is meant by ‘the rule of law’, to what part of the rule 
of law the Tribunal contributes, and in what way. Upon comprehensive analysis, 
however, a mosaic of elements that the Tribunal associated with this term can be 
put together. What emerges is a framework of minimum rule of law standards 
11  Cf. SC Res. 827, UN Doc S/RES/827 (1993), 25 May 1993, preamble.
12  The completion strategy foresaw a “three-phase plan”, with all investigations terminated 
before the end of 2004, all first instance trials completed by the end of 2008 and the 
completion of all of the ICTY’s work in 2010. The deadline concerning investigations 
has been met, whereas the other two have been extended several times. The Tribunal 
has closed in 2017. The Mechanism for International Criminal Tribunals (MICT) 
will subsequently complete all the remaining work, including appeals, enforcement of 
sentences, and non-judicial tasks.
13  Cf. ICTY, ‘Completion Strategy’, available at http://www.icty.org/en/sid/10016 (last 
visited 10 December 2018) [ICTY, Completion Strategy]; SC Res. 1503, UN Doc S/
RES/1503, 28 August 2003, 2 [SC Res. 1503]; SC Res. 1534, UN Doc S/RES/1534 
(2004), 26 March 2004, 3; see also Barria & Roper, ‘Judicial Capacity Building in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina’, supra note 9, 318; A. S. Canter, ‘“For These Reasons, the Chamber: 
Denies the Prosecutor’s Request for Referral”: The False Hope of Rule 11Bis’, 32 Fordham 
International Law Journal (2008) 5, 1614, 1654.
14  J. Hocking, ‘Opening Remarks, Legacy Conference’ (2017), 4, available at http://
www.icty.org/x/file/Press/Statements%20and%20Speeches/Registrar/20170622-john-
hocking-opening-remarks-sarajevo_en.pdf (last visited 10 December 2018).
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with which national justice systems must comply before the ICTY deems these 
systems – bluntly said – good enough.15
In the following section, I will outline the policy and legal mechanisms 
that brought rule of law promotion into the realm of the ICTY’s occupation. 
It will be demonstrated that the Tribunal’s understanding of the rule of law 
has changed over time, reflecting the changing standing of the ICTY. In the 
beginning, the Tribunal had to struggle to be recognized as an international law 
enforcer – a role of which it reminded its audience again towards the end of its 
operation in view of building up a legacy narrative. In public statements from 
those times, the Tribunal therefore emphasized the international rule of law 
(IRoL). In between, however, the turning point being the completion strategy, 
its focus shifted towards the national rule of law (NRoL). With the completion 
strategy, the ICTY’s jurisdictional regime factually changed from primacy over 
to complementarity to national courts. This change is manifested in Rule 11bis 
of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence (RPE) which were amended in 2002 in 
order to allow the referral of cases from The Hague to national courts. Rule 11bis 
triggered a number of rule of law promotion efforts by the Tribunal, effectively 
becoming the legal basis, or at least the legal vehicle, for the Tribunal’s activities 
in that regard. Section C will present the ICTY’s notion of the national rule of 
law, as it is deduced from case law, discourse, and document analysis. This notion 
can be divided into a normative dimension, an institutional dimension, and a 
cultural dimension. In the normative dimension, the necessity of a legislative 
framework that foresees the adjudication of international crimes and guarantees 
certain fundamental human rights, especially fair trial rights, is highlighted by 
the ICTY. This is the law that should rule. If the notion ended here, it would 
come down to rule by laws that foresee adjudication of international crimes 
under respect for fair trial rights. Yet, such a definition has no added value 
in practice. Hence, the ICTY identified principles that ensure or support this 
rule by law which can be attributed to an institutional dimension on the one 
hand and a cultural dimension on the other. The institutional dimension 
comprises independent and impartial judicial organs that work efficiently and 
in a transparent manner. Lastly, a culture of law is paramount to the functioning 
of the rule of law. According to the ICTY, ordinary citizens, as well as public 
officials, and representatives of the judicial sector must adopt an “ideology of 
15  Necessarily, given the Tribunal’s field of competence and activity, this framework remains 
narrow and focused on the criminal justice system, although at times, ICTY actors do 
adopt a broader perspective.
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legality”16 – which only happens if people are aware of accountability proceedings 
for international crimes and therefore develop trust into judicial institutions 
again. It is remarkable that also within the notion of the national rule of law 
one can observe change over time, with different elements being emphasized at 
different moments. In section D, it will be shown through examples that the 
ICTY aligned its rule of law promotion efforts according to what it deemed 
relevant in the rule of law at the respective time. To be clear, the ICTY’s main 
priority had always been to exercise its core mandate of prosecuting and trying 
perpetrators of international crimes in the courtrooms of The Hague. However, 
over the years, it extended its activities beyond that. With a conception of the 
rule of law, with which the former Yugoslav countries should comply, in mind, 
it took steps that were clearly geared towards supporting the domestic actors 
in approaching this rule of law ideal. Three main activities to that end will be 
presented before some concluding remarks will be made in section E.
B. The ICTY’s Shifting Rule of Law Notions Over Time
In order to understand how the ICTY became an actor in rule of law 
promotion, it must first be understood what the Tribunal understood by the 
‘rule of law’. The findings of this contribution are based on a discourse analysis 
of all accessible public statements of ICTY representatives17 and on a content 
analysis of all available ICTY publications.18 In a first step, the inquiry was purely 
16  T. Meron, ‘Statement of Theodor Meron, President of the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, Delivered at the Inauguration of the War Crimes 
Chamber of the State Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina’, TM/MOW/945 e, 9 March 
2005, available at http://www.icty.org/en/press/statement-theodor-meron-president-
international-criminal-tribunal-former-yugoslavia-delivered (last visited 10 December 
2018) [Meron, Statement 9 March 2005].
17  Firstly, this concerned the 101 public statements and speeches given by the three ICTY 
officials (the ICTY presidents, chief prosecutors, and registrars), available at http://www.
icty.org/en/press/statements-and-speeches-of-the-icty (last visited 10 December 2018). In 
addition, the opening statements of the prosecutor in every trial were considered.
18  Documents analyzed up until 21 December 2017: the Tribunal’s 24 annual reports, 
available at http://www.icty.org/en/documents/annual-reports; 28 completion strategy 
reports, available at http://www.icty.org/en/documents/completion-strategy-and-mict; 
2185 press releases, available at http://www.icty.org/en/press/press-releases-archive; the 
161 ICTY Digests (a publication that was distributed as of 2006 in order to inform the 
public about the Tribunal’s work), available at http://www.icty.org/en/documents/icty-
digest; as well as the only three annual reports of the Outreach Program from 2011, 2012, 
and 2013, available at http://www.icty.org/en/outreach/outreach-annual-reports, as well 
as the “15 Years of Outreach at the ICTY” report, available at http://www.icty.org/x/file/
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quantitative; counting how many times the term ‘rule of law’ is mentioned in 
connection to the work of the Tribunal. This was done with a simple electronic 
search (control+F “rule of law”). In a second step, the respective hit was closely 
looked at in order to study 1) in what context the term ‘rule of law’ was used, 2) 
whether any precise clarification on the meaning of the term was given, or – in 
the absence of a definition: 3) what aspects are subsumed under the ‘rule of law’ 
or considered to be part of it. What this analysis reveals is that the ICTY’s rule 
of law notion changed over time, reflecting the changing standing of the ICTY.
I. The Beginning: Standing its Ground as International Law 
 Enforcer
In the beginning, in the years 1996-1999, the Tribunal primarily placed 
its work into the context of the ‘international rule of law’ (see figure 1 below), 
which refers to upholding and enforcing international law.19 One line of 
references to the ‘rule of law’ thus sounds like this excerpt from the press release 
that announced the commencement of the ICTY’s first trial in the Tadić case: 
“The upcoming trial marks the first occasion for the implementation 
of international humanitarian law, a body of law designed to regulate 
the conduct of combatants and to protect civilians during wars. It 
is based on standards agreed upon by States. By implementing this 
body of law, the International Tribunal will give it its true meaning. 
This first trial is thus an exercise in the assertion of the rule of law 
over the law of the gun, as this war-torn century draws to a close.”20 
In emphasizing its role as the enforcer of universal international 
humanitarian and criminal law, the Tribunal sought to justify its existence 
and operation. This was particularly necessary in its early years for several 
reasons: first, the ICTY was the first modern international criminal tribunal 
Outreach/15-years-of-outreach/outreach-15_en_light.pdf; all last visited 10 December 
2018. 
19  In total, there are 55 references to the ‘international rule of law’ in official ICTY statements 
or publications, 292 to the ‘national rule of law’, and for 18 references it was unclear 
whether the international or the national rule of law was meant.
20  ICTY, ‘The Tribunal’s First Trial: Another Step in the Fulfillment of the Tribunal’s 
Mandate’, CC/PIO/070-E, 6 May 1996, available at http://www.icty.org/en/press/
tribunals-first-trial-another-step-fulfillment-tribunals-mandate (last visited 10 December 
2018).
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that pursued to develop upon the legacy of the Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals 
that had operated five decades earlier, but with the aim of providing fair trials 
and of avoiding to be labelled as exercising “victor’s justice”. Second, the ICTY’s 
establishment by the UN Security Council under a thereto unheard interpretation 
of its powers under Chapter VII of the UN Charter had been questioned, 
criticized, and challenged.21 In order not to be perceived as a political organ, it 
needed to situate itself in a legal context and recall its judicial nature. Third, as 
if that hadn’t been challenging enough, the ICTY had a somewhat slow start 
that made many observers doubt whether it would ever operate effectively: it was 
officially established in May 1993, but without a courthouse, without staff, and 
without facilities. The judges, together with first staff members, who arrived in 
The Hague shortly after that, had to keep themselves busy with designing the 
Rules of Procedure and Evidence until May 1996 when the first trial against the 
accused Duško Tadić eventually commenced.22 In the absence of a police force 
that would arrest the Tribunal’s defendants, the ICTY depended on States or 
other international organizations to arrest and surrender them. In the case of 
Tadić, for instance, the ICTY had ordered Germany to hand over the accused, 
so that it could finally start its core judicial work. Given these challenges during 
its first years, the ICTY pointed out the significance of its mandate – to address 
international crimes – which would be important enough as to heal all the 
criticism against it. Linking the prosecution of international crimes to the re-
establishment of the international rule of law gave it the additional legitimacy 
that was needed to counter the criticism.
21  Most notably by its first defendant Duško Tadić: Prosecutor v. Tadić, Motion on the 
Jurisdiction of the Tribunal, IT-94-T, Trial Chamber, 23 June 1995, 2; for the Appeals 
Chamber’s judgment, see: Prosecutor v. Tadić, Decision on the Defence Motion for 
Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, Appeals Chamber, IT-94-1-AR72, 2 October 1995, 
para. 9-48.
22  Cf. ICTY, ‘Timeline’, available at http://www.icty.org/en/features/timeline (last visited 
10 December 2018).
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Figure 1
II. The Completion Strategy: Preparing the Ground for Rule of 
 Law Promotion
Over the years, references to the NRoL, the rule of law within a country, 
which commonly sets out rules that govern a particular society, increased 
dramatically (see figure 1 above). In 2002/2003, when the ICTY was at the height 
of its operation, with less than 20 out of 161 indictees remaining at large,23 the 
ICTY judges – together with the judges of the International Criminal Tribunal 
for Rwanda (ICTR) – designed the completion strategy of their tribunals. 
The completion strategy was a plan to gradually terminate trials at the ICTY, 
although making sure that its work would be properly continued in the region 
23  Cf. ICTY, Annual Report 2003, A/58/297-S/2003/829, 20 August 2003, 10, available 
at http://www.icty.org/x/file/About/Reports%20and%20Publications/AnnualReports/
annual_report_2003_en.pdf (last visited 10 December 2018).
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was also increasingly seen as a “key aspect” of the Tribunal’s legacy.24 The idea 
was that the ICTY “concludes its mission successfully, in a timely way and in 
coordination with domestic legal systems in the former Yugoslavia.”25 ICTY 
representatives even went as far as purporting that the Tribunal’s own success 
depended on whether it would have rebuilt the rule of law in the countries 
under its jurisdiction – as expressed in the words of Serge Brammertz, the last 
Prosecutor of the ICTY:
“[T]he completion of the Tribunal’s mandate is not the end of war 
crimes[26] justice, but the beginning of the next chapter. Further 
accountability for the crimes now depends fully on national 
judiciaries in the former Yugoslavia. Thousands of cases remain to 
be processed, particularly many complex cases against senior- and 
mid-level suspects in every country. So ultimately, I believe that 
the ICTY’s legacy is not simply measured by our own work, but by 
whether the countries of the former Yugoslavia build the rule of law 
and demonstrate they can secure meaningful justice for the victims 
of serious crimes during the conflicts.”27
The completion strategy report from 2009 is even more explicit in this 
regard as it stated that: “The ultimate goal of the Tribunal’s legacy strategy is 
entrenchment of the rule of law in the former Yugoslavia.”28
In this spirit, the UN Security Council had already explicitly called upon 
the Tribunal to “strengthen[…] the capacity of [the national] jurisdictions”29 
24  Cf. C. Garbett, ‘Transitional Justice and “National Ownership”: An Assessment of the 
Institutional Development of the War Crimes Chamber of Bosnia and Herzegovina’, 13 
Human Rights Review (2012) 1, 65, 65.
25  ICTY, ‘Completion Strategy’, supra note 13; cf. SC Res. 1503, supra note 13, 2.
26  This generic term is used to refer to the prosecution of all so-called international crimes 
(namely, those commonly found in the statutes of international criminal courts and 
tribunals). It will also sometimes be used in this contribution and will – unless made 
explicit otherwise – be synonymous with “international crimes”. 
27  ICTY, ‘#ICTY24: Commemoration held at United Nations Headquarters’ (2017), 
available at http://www.icty.org/en/press/icty24-commemoration-held-at-united-nations-
headquarters (last visited 10 December 2018).
28  ICTY, Completion Strategy Report November 2009, UN Doc S/2009/589, 13 November 
2009, 21, available at http://www.icty.org/x/file/About/Reports%20and%20Publications/
CompletionStrategy/completion_strategy_13nov2009_en.pdf (last visted 12 June 2018) 
[ICTY, Completion Strategy Report November 2009].
29  SC Res. 1503, supra note 13, 2.
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in the former Yugoslavia when it endorsed the proposed completion strategy in 
2003, as this was considered “crucially important to the rule of law”30. At that 
same time, the political and legal systems in the former Yugoslav countries were 
consolidating, with Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) becoming a member of the 
Council of Europe in April 2002 and Serbia in April 2003.31 The Tribunal more 
and more assumed the role of assisting this consolidation process, especially by 
contributing to rebuilding their national justice systems. 
As one of the major instruments of the completion strategy, the ICTY judges 
proposed to transform Rule 11bis of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence into 
a legal basis for transferring cases to national courts in the former Yugoslavia.32 
Essentially, this case transfer system would be killing two birds with one stone: 
it would permit the ICTY to reduce its case load in view of winding down, 
and it would kick off and catalyze domestic war crimes proceedings, thereby 
strengthening the domestic rule of law. As will be shown in section D below, 
the case transfers brought about a series of rule of law promotion measures, 
effectively rendering Rule 11bis the mechanism behind the ICTY’s rule of law 
transfer efforts.
The idea was to transfer cases concerning low- and intermediate-level 
perpetrators from the ICTY to national courts in the former Yugoslavia, and 
to concentrate on those crimes “most prejudicial to international public order”33 
30  Ibid., 2; the same was reiterated in operative part point 9 of SC Res. 1534, UN Doc S/
RES/1534 (2004), 26 March 2004, 3.
31  Available at https://www.coe.int/en/web/portal/bosnia-and-herzegovina (last visited 10 
December 2018) and available at https://www.coe.int/en/web/portal/serbia (last visited 
10 December 2018); Croatia had been a member since November 1996; available at 
https://www.coe.int/en/web/portal/croatia (last visited 10 December 2018). 
32  Rule 11bis had been inserted into the ICTY’s RPE as early as 1997, at the time providing 
the possibility to suspend an indictment at the ICTY if a national court could and would 
exercise its jurisdiction; Rule 11bis in its original available at http://www.icty.org/x/
file/Legal%20Library/Rules_procedure_evidence/IT032_rev12_en.pdf (last visited 10 
December 2018) [Rule 11bis]. For amendments, see the different versions available at 
http://www.icty.org/en/documents/rules-procedure-evidence (last visited 10 December 
2018); and generally M. Bohlander, ‘Referring an indictment from the ICTY and 
ICTR to another court - Rule 11bis and the consequences for the law of extradition’, 
55 International and Comparative Law Quarterly (2006) 1, 219. Its current form was 
introduced in July 2004 with revision 32.
33  C. Jorda, ‘Report on the Judicial Status of the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
former Yugoslavia and the Prospects for Referring Certain Cases to National Courts’, 
annexed to the ‘Letter dated 10 June 2002 from the President of the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia addressed to the Secretary General’, 
annexed to the ‘Letter dated 17 June 2002 from the Secretary-General addressed to 
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in The Hague. A case would, however, only be referred if certain conditions 
were satisfied, most importantly, that the national court would be able to fully 
conform with internationally recognized standards of human rights and due 
process.34 
Rule 11bis, amended accordingly in December 2002, foresaw the 
possibility to refer a case (whether with or without the accused already being 
arrested) to any State which could and would exercise jurisdiction over it:35 
either because the crimes had been committed on its territory (Rule 11bis (A) 
(i) RPE), or because the accused was arrested in that State (Rule 11bis (A) (ii) 
RPE), or because the State otherwise has jurisdiction and accepts the case (Rule 
11bis (A) (iii) RPE).36 A case could only be referred if the State’s justice system 
was adequately prepared, if the accused would receive a fair trial, and if the 
death penalty would not be imposed or carried out.37 Importantly, although 
the condition of the State being “adequately prepared” is mentioned only in 
Rule 11bis (A) (iii) and on a plain reading, one would therefore think that this 
condition only relates to those States otherwise having jurisdiction, it must in 
fact be met for any (of the three) jurisdictional scenarios. This follows from the 
system of Rule 11bis that requires reading paragraphs (A) and (B) together. The 
Appeals Chamber has held this view in Stanković: 
“as a strictly textual matter, Rule 11bis (A) does not require that 
a jurisdiction be ‘willing and adequately prepared to accept’ 
a transferred case if it was the territory in which the crime was 
committed or in which the accused was arrested. But that is beside 
the point, because unquestionably a jurisdiction’s willingness and 
capacity to accept a referred case is an explicit prerequisite for 
any referral to a domestic jurisdiction […]. Thus, the ‘willing and 
the President of the Security Council’ , 19 June 2002, 5, available at http://www.icty.
org/x/file/About/Reports%20and%20Publications/CompletionStrategy/judicial_status_
report_june2002_en.pdf (last visited 10 December 2018) [Jorda, Report on the Judicial 
Status of the ICTY].
34  Cf. ibid., 13-14.
35  A Referral Bench can decide to refer a case either proprio motu or upon application of the 
prosecutor (R11bis (B) RPE), supra note 32.
36  In the beginning, the amendments only comprised States that would have territorial 
jurisdiction, or where the accused would be arrested, but this was extended in July 2004. 
R11bis (A)RPE, supra note 32.
37  R11bis (B)RPE, supra note 32.
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adequately prepared’ prong of Rule 11bis(A)(iii) is implicit also in 
the Rule 11bis(B) analysis.”38
Apart from that, because high profile cases were to remain in The Hague, 
the Referral Bench also had to consider the gravity of the crimes at stake and 
the level of responsibility of the accused.39 When a decision for referral of a 
case was taken, the accused, together with all necessary material supporting the 
indictment had to be transferred to the competent national authorities.40 
An important element of Rule 11bis was the possibility for the ICTY 
Prosecutor to monitor the national proceedings.41 If s/he deemed it necessary – 
for instance because of insufficient respect for fair trial rights – s/he could apply 
to the Referral Bench to revoke the referral.42 This deferral mechanism was 
supposed to encourage national judiciaries to do particularly well in complying 
with international standards and to threaten them in case they would not.43 
A deferral would have meant for the national justice system to lose face both, 
towards their own population as well as towards the ‘international community’ – 
a situation, which all countries of the former Yugoslavia wanted to avoid in order 
to rehabilitate their reputation as solid democracies operating under the rule of 
law. So, it was in the interest of both the ICTY and the national authorities to 
establish the conditions for a fair handling of these so-called Rule 11bis cases.44
38  Prosecutor v. Stanković, Decision, Appeals Chamber, IT-96-23/2-PT, 1 September 2005, 
para. 40.
39  R11bis (C) RPE, supra note 32; paragraphs (A) and (B) also set out procedural safeguards 
that must be met before referral is permitted: a case can only be referred back to the 
national judiciary if an indictment had been issued and confirmed already, but the trial 
must not yet have begun. The accused must have had the opportunity to be heard.
40  R11bis (D) (i) and (iii) RPE, supra note 32.
41  R11bis (D) (iv) RPE, supra note 32.
42  R11bis (F) RPE, supra note 32.
43  In the words of former chief prosecutor Carla del Ponte: “The mere existence of such 
a provision [that would enable the ICTY to defer back the case] should act as a strong 
incentive for the relevant domestic judicial authorities to handle the case in accordance 
with accepted international standards.”; ICTY OTP, Completion Strategy Report 
May 2004, UN Doc S/2004/420, 24 May 2004, 45, available at http://www.icty.
org/x/file/About/Reports%20and%20Publications/CompletionStrategy/completion_
strategy_24may2004_en.pdf (last visited 10 December 2018).
44  Cf. ICTY OTP, Completion Strategy Report November 2017, UN Doc S/2017/1001, 29 
November 2017, 76, available at http://www.icty.org/x/file/About/Reports%20and%20
Publications/CompletionStrategy/171129-completion-strategy-report-icty.pdf (last 
visited 10 December 2018); indeed, the State Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina sees 
the referral of six cases to its jurisdiction as a “recognition” of its professionality and its 
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At the same time, monitoring the adjudication of Rule 11bis cases provided 
the opportunity for targeted capacity building as it directly revealed deficiencies 
in the prosecution and adjudication of war crimes trials. Those deficiencies would 
then be addressed in tailor-made trainings for the local actors involved.45 That 
way, “[t]he referral of [Rule 11bis] cases to national jurisdictions also served […] 
to strengthen the capacity of those jurisdictions in the prosecution and trial of 
violations of international humanitarian law,”46 “thus reinforcing the rule of law 
in these new States.”47 The monitoring was implemented by the Organisation for 
Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) on behalf of the ICTY Office of 
compliance with high standards in adjudicating war crimes: “Priznanje profesionalnog 
rada i poštivanje visokih standarda u krivičnim procesima pred Sudom BiH ogleda se i u 
odlukama Međunarodnog krivičnog suda za bivšu Jugoslaviju, koji je, u skladu sa Pravilom 
11 bis, Sudu BiH na dalje postupanje ustupio 6 predmeta sa 10 osumnjičenih. To su bile 
prve odluke o ustupanju predmeta jednom sudu u regionu, što je za Sud BiH bilo veliko 
priznanje.” (in English: “The recognition that the SCBiH works professionally and 
respects high standards in its criminal trials is reflected in the decisions of the ICTY to 
refer six cases concerning ten accused to be adjudicated at the SCBiH. Those were the first 
decisions to transfer cases to a court in the region, which represents for the SCBiH a huge 
appreciation.” (author’s own translation)); Sud Bosne i Herzegovine, ‘Istorijat Suda BiH’, 
available at http://www.sudbih.gov.ba/stranica/86/pregled (last visited 10 December 
2018).
45  Interview with representatives of the OSCE, Sarajevo, 2 February 2017; similar: ICTY 
OTP, Completion Strategy Report May 2007, UN Doc S/2007/283, 16 May 2007, 
16, available at http://www.icty.org/x/file/About/Reports%20and%20Publications/
CompletionStrategy/completion_strategy_16may2007_en.pdf (last visited 10 December 
2018).
46  ICTY, Completion Strategy Report November 2011, UN Doc S/2011/716, 16 November 
2011, 13, available at http://www.icty.org/x/file/About/Reports%20and%20Publications/
CompletionStrategy/completion_strategy_16nov2011_en.pdf (last visited 10 December 
2018).
47  ICTY, Completion Strategy Report May 2012, UN Doc S/2012/354, 23 May 2012, 
11, available at http://www.icty.org/x/file/About/Reports%20and%20Publications/
CompletionStrategy/completion_strategy_23may2012_en.pdf (last visited 10 December 
2018); see also ICTY, Completion Strategy Report November 2004, UN Doc S/2004/897, 
23 November 2004, 3, available at http://www.icty.org/x/file/About/Reports%20and%20
Publications/CompletionStrategy/completion_strategy_23november2004_en.pdf (last 
visited 10 December 2018); ICTY, Completion Strategy Report May 2005, UN Doc 
S/2005/343, 25 May 2005, 3, available at http://www.icty.org/x/file/About/Reports%20
and%20Publications/CompletionStrategy/completion_strategy_25may2005_en.pdf 
(last visited 10 December 2018) [ICTY, Completion Strategy Report May 2005].
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the Prosecutor (OTP),48 and the capacity building programme was developed in 
close cooperation between the two organizations.
Strikingly, the completion strategy de facto changed the Tribunal’s 
jurisdictional regime from primacy and deferrals, to complementarity and 
referrals. Article 9 of the ICTY Statute stipulates a concurrent jurisdictional 
regime between the Hague Tribunal and domestic courts, with the Tribunal 
retaining primacy. This implies that the ICTY was never meant to prosecute all 
persons responsible for serious violations committed in the territory of the former 
Yugoslavia. In fact, when proposing to establish the ICTY, the UN Secretary 
General suggested that instead of precluding and preventing national courts 
to exercise their jurisdiction, they should be encouraged to prosecute and try 
perpetrators of violations of their national law.49 For about a decade, this did not 
have any implications. Instead of advocating national prosecutions, the ICTY 
Prosecutor applied for deferrals under Article 9 (2) of the ICTY Statute and as a 
consequence, a number of cases for international crimes were taken away from 
national courts and deferred to the Tribunal in The Hague.50 However, with the 
implementation of the completion strategy and the introduction of Rule 11bis, 
this trend was not only stopped, but reversed. As of then, the Tribunal gave 
back cases and it would only step in when they were not handled correctly at the 
domestic level. At the same time, the ICTY assisted domestic jurisdictions in 
living up to its standards through a broad capacity building programme. 
Thus, while the completion strategy heralded the Tribunal’s policy change 
regarding its jurisdictional regime, putting the national rule of law into the 
focus of the Tribunal, Rule 11bis became the vehicle for the ICTY’s rule of law 
promotion efforts.
III. The End: Preparing for the ICTY’s Legacy
Interestingly, as the Tribunal’s closure approached and with the 
Mechanism for International Criminal Tribunals (MICT), the court that carries 
out the remaining functions of the ICTR and the ICTY since their respective 
48  For the agreement and OSCE progress reports on each case, see ICTY, ‘Status of 
Transferred Cases’, available at http://www.icty.org/en/cases/transfer-of-cases/status-of-
transferred-cases (last visited 10 December 2018). See also ICTY, Completion Strategy 
Report May 2005, supra note 47, 10.
49  Cf. United Nations Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary General Pursuant to 
Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 808, UN Doc S/25704, 3 May 1993, 16.
50  The most famous deferrals are the cases against the ICTY’s first accused Duško Tadić, 
which was taken from Germany, and against Dražan Erdemović, taken from Yugoslavia.
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closures in 2015 and 2017, preparing to operate as of 2013, allusions to the 
international rule of law became more prominent again (see figure 1 above). 
In public statements, ICTY officials again more often reminded its audience 
of its role as an international law enforcement mechanism and recalled its 
achievements in that respect, as exemplified by former ICTY President Meron 
observing in 2015 that “through hundreds of rulings addressing principles of 
international criminal, humanitarian, and human rights law, the ICTY has 
played a crucial role in strengthening international law and the rule of law and 
has made major contributions to the implementation of the purposes of the UN 
Charter.”51 It thereby sought to make sure that its pioneering role in upholding 
the international rule of law wouldn’t be forgotten.
In the remaining sections of this contribution, references to the 
international rule of law will be disregarded as it falls outside the scope of rule of 
law transfer and the focus will be on the ‘national rule of law’ and the ICTY’s 
promotion efforts.
C. The ICTY’s Notion of the National Rule of Law
Clues about the Tribunal’s national rule of law notion can be found in 
the jurisprudence rendered following referral applications by the OTP under 
Rule 11bis.52 A system good enough for receiving a case would necessarily abide 
by the rule of law. Taken together, the factors the Referral Bench examined 
before agreeing to refer a case,53 constitute a framework of minimum standards 
with which national justice systems must comply before the Tribunal deemed 
51  Adding that, in the years to come, the MICT (of which Meron is the current President) 
will carry forward the important work of the ICTY and the ICTR, thereby reflecting “the 
UN’s continued commitment to justice and principled accountability”; ICTY, ‘Tribunal 
and the Mechanism Commemorate 70 years of the United Nations’, Press Release 20 
October 2015, available at http://www.icty.org/en/press/tribunal-and-mechanism-
commemorate-70-years-united-nations (last visited 10 December 2018).
52  Necessarily, given the Tribunal’s field of competence and activity, this framework remains 
narrow and focused on the criminal justice system, although at times, ICTY actors do 
adopt a broader perspective.
53  It might be worth noting that the Referral Bench was the same in all cases, consisting 
of Judge Alphons Orie (presiding), Judge O-Gon Kwon, and Judge Kevin Parker. The 
composition of the Appeals Chamber varied, however always involving the judges 
Fausto Pocar, Theodor Meron, Mohamed Shahabuddeen, Mehmet Güney, Wolfgang 
Schomburg, Florence Ndepele Mwachande Mumba, Andrésia Vaz, and Liu Daqun.
237The Rule of Law à la ICTY
them “adequate”.54 This framework can be complemented through the discourse 
and document analysis of official statements and publications, deducing further 
elements that the ICTY views as being part of the national rule of law, or that it 
clearly links to the national rule of law. The list of elements is presented in figure 
2 below; and the emerging mosaic, with its normative dimension, institutional 
dimension, and cultural dimension will be presented in the remainder of this 
section. It is remarkable that also within the notion of the national rule of law 
one can observe change over time, with different elements being emphasized at 
different moments. In section D, three main rule of law promotion activities, 
reflecting the Tribunal’s current rule of law notion at the respective time, will 
be presented.
54  Necessarily, this framework remains fragmented: the general scope is determined by 
Rule 11bis (supra note 32) itself, which mentions some of the parameters to be appraised. 
What elements within these broad parameters the Bench specifically examines or what 
elements it analyses in depth depends on the questions at stake in each individual case, 
and often also on what the parties emphasize in their submissions. Consequently, the 
framework that emerges is more detailed on some elements (such as on impartiality and 
independence of national courts, the right to examine witnesses or humane detention 
conditions; see below) than on others. For instance, safeguards that an accused does not 
have to stand trial if s/he is mentally unfit (as part of the accused’s fair trial rights) were 
only addressed in Kovačević, as this was not an issue in any other case.
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Figure 2
Normative dimension (blue): accountability for war crimes, fair trial rights, 
establishing truth, addressing the past, integrity of confidential material, human 
rights, victims- and witness protection, victims rights, adequate detention, codification 
of IHL and ICL; institutional dimension (red): competence of the judiciary, regional 
and international cooperation, independence of the judiciary, effectiveness and 
efficiency of the judiciary, transparency of the judiciary; cultural dimension (green): 
awareness of accountability proceedings, culture of law, fairness of the judiciary, 
trust in state institutions;”unclear”: references to the national rule of law without any 
connection to a particular element, or where the reference is ambiguous 
I. Normative Dimension
According to the ICTY, in order for the societies in the countries 
of the former Yugoslavia to function under the rule of law, they need to 
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acknowledge the past,55 learn from it, reconcile with it, and move on.56 In 
this context, it is necessary that international crimes are addressed through 
criminal prosecutions. Perpetrators must be arrested,57 brought to justice,58 held 
accountable,59 and punished.60 On the one hand, trials would help to establish 
55  Cf. ICTY, ‘Completion Strategy: Prosecutor Brammertz’s Address Before the Security 
Council’, Press Release, FS/OTP/1466e, 7 December 2011, available at http://www.
icty.org/en/press/completion-strategy-prosecutor-brammertz’s-address-security-council 
(last visited 10 December 2018); this and subsequent references to different rule of law 
elements are only examples. As has been explained, many references are repeated many 
times and it would be excessive to replicate all of them in the footnotes.
56  Cf. C. del Ponte, ‘Address by Tribunal Prosecutor Carla Del Ponte to NATO Parliamentary 
Assembly: The ICTY and the Legacy of the Past’, CdP/OTP/ PR1193e, 26 October 2007, 
available at http://www.icty.org/en/press/address-tribunal-prosecutor-carla-del-ponte-
nato-parliamentary-assembly-belgrade-icty-and (last visited 10 December 2018); in the 
figures, these elements have been regrouped together under “addressing the past”.
57  Cf. G. Kirk McDonald, ‘ICTY President Gabrielle Kirk McDonald addresses the 
“Dayton” Peace Implementation Council’, CC/PIO/272-E, 9 December 1997, available 
at http://www.icty.org/en/press/icty-president-gabrielle-kirk-mcdonald-addresses-
dayton-peace-implementation-council (last visited 10 December 2018); C. del Ponte, 
‘Address by Carla del Ponte, Prosecutor of the ICTY, to the UN Security Council’, 
CDP/P.I.S./917-e, 23 November 2004, available at http://www.icty.org/en/press/address-
carla-del-ponte-prosecutor-icty-un-security-council (last visited 10 December 2018); S. 
Brammertz, ‘Completion Strategy Report: Prosecutor Brammertz’s address before the 
Security Council’, VE/CS/PR1571e, 12 June 2013, available at http://www.icty.org/en/
press/completion-strategy-report-prosecutor-brammertz’s-address-security-council-0 
(last visited 10 December 2018).
58  Cf. F. Pocar, ‘Address of Judge Fausto Pocar, President of the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, to the United Nations General Assembly’, AH/
MOW/1288e, 13 October 2008, available at http://www.icty.org/en/press/address-judge-
fausto-pocar-president-international-criminal-tribunal-former-yugoslavia-united (last 
visited 10 December 2018).
59  Cf. T. Meron, ‘Statement by President Meron on the occasion of International Justice Day’, 
16 July 2015, 1, available at http://www.icty.org/x/file/Press/Statements%20and%20
Speeches/President/150716-president_meron_international_justice_day_en.pdf (last 
visited 10 December 2018); G. Kirk McDonald, ‘The International Criminal Tribunal 
for the former Yugoslavia: Making a Difference or Making Excuses?’, JL/PIU/402-E, 
13 May 1999, available at http://www.icty.org/en/press/international-criminal-tribunal-
former-yugoslavia-making-difference-or-making-excuses (last visited 10 December 2018) 
[Kirk McDonald, Making a Difference or Making Excuses?].
60  Cf. ICTY, Annual Report 1994, UN Doc A/49/342 S/1994/1007, 29 August 1994, 
12, available at http://www.icty.org/x/file/About/Reports%20and%20Publications/
AnnualReports/annual_report_1994_en.pdf (last visited 10 December 2018); in the 
figures, these elements have been regrouped together under “accountability for war 
crimes”.
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the facts about the violent past.61 Moreover and more importantly, however, 
they are about establishing individual criminal responsibility.62 Prosecuting and 
trying perpetrators of international crimes was reiterated over and over again 
throughout the existence of the Tribunal, with a noticeable high in the beginning 
of the 2000s. In that period, the ICTY started to envisage its own closure and 
therefore pointed out that prosecutions of international crimes would have to be 
continued by the national justice systems in the former Yugoslavia (see figure 3 
below). Accordingly, it started to lobby and support these countries, especially 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, to set up specialized institutions for that purpose. It 
also helped to kick off the work of these institutions by referring them low- and 
mid-level perpetrator cases, and scrutinizing and supporting the adjudication of 
these cases. This explicit rule of law promotion effort will be further explained 
in section D.I. below. The importance of accountability proceedings in order 
to reestablish the rule of law was again frequently recalled when the ICTY 
approached its closure, of which it was reminded when the MICT was preparing 
to operate and in its very final year of existence (see figure 3 below).
61  Cf. ICTY, Digest 52, 17 February 2009, 1, available at http://www.icty.org/x/file/About/
Reports%20and%20Publications/ICTYDigest/icty_digest_52_en.pdf (last visited 10 
December 2018); in the figures, this element is called “establishing truth”.
62  Cf. Prosecutor v. Deronjić, Closing Statement, IT-02-61-S, 231, available at http://www.
icty.org/x/cases/deronjic/trans/en/040128IT.htm (last visited 10 December 2018).
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Figure 3
1. Applicable Substantive Law
The legal framework within which prosecutions and trials should be 
conducted was clarified in Rule 11bis cases, where the Tribunal verified whether 
the domestic law is adequate for prosecuting, trying, and eventually (if found 
guilty) punishing the defendant.63 In general, the ICTY deemed that in order 
to hold international crimes trials,64 the domestic legal framework must entail 
63  Cf. Prosecutor v. Stanković, Decision, Referral Bench, IT-96-23/2-PT, 17 May 2005, 
para. 37 [Cf. Prosecutor v. Stanković, Referral Bench]; see also W. W. Burke-White, ‘The 
Domestic Influence of International Criminal Tribunals: The International Criminal 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and the Creation of the State Court of Bosnia & 
Herzegovina’, 46 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law (2007) 2, 279, 323 [Burke-
White, The Domestic Influence].
64  Cf. ICTY, ‘OHR-ICTY Working Group on Development of BiH Capacity for War-
crimes Trial Successfully Completed’, Press Release, OHR/P.I.S./731e, 21 February 
2013, available at http://www.icty.org/en/press/ohr-icty-working-group-development-
bih-capacity-war-crimes-trial-successfully-completed (last visited 10 December 2018); T. 
Meron, ‘Statement by President Meron on Establishment of Special War Crimes Chamber 
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provisions of international humanitarian and international criminal law.65 This 
would be an “assertion of the rule of law over the law of the gun”66, “breaking 
the cycle of impunity”67. The Referral Bench’s focus, however, was whether the 
material elements of the crime are covered by the criminal law applicable at the 
time of the offence,68 whether it provides for appropriate modes of liability to 
reflect the accused’s conduct, and whether an appropriate punishment exists.69
Although the ICTY thus recommended codifying international criminal 
law, it was satisfied if the material elements of offences underlying international 
crimes were covered by the applicable ordinary criminal law.70 It was important, 
in Bosnian State Court’, JL/P.I.S./761-e, 13 June 2003, available at http://www.icty.org/
en/press/statement-president-meron-establishment-special-war-crimes-chamber-bosnian-
state-court (last visited 10 December 2018); T. Meron, ‘Address of Judge Theodor Meron, 
President of the ICTY, to the UN Security Council’, TM/P.I.S./916-e, 23 November 
2004, available at http://www.icty.org/en/press/address-judge-theodor-meron-president-
icty-un-security-council (last visited 10 December 2018); ICTY, Annual Report 2005, 
UN Doc A/60/267–S/2005/532, 17 August 2005, 38, available at http://www.icty.org/x/
file/About/Reports%20and%20Publications/AnnualReports/annual_report_2005_
en.pdf (last visited 10 December 2018).
65  Cf. ICTY, Completion Strategy Report November 2009, supra note 28, 21; in the figures, 
this element is called “codification of IHL and ICL”.
66  ICTY, ‘The Tribunal’s First Trial: Another Step in the Fulfillment of the Tribunal’s 
Mandate’, Press Release, CC/PIO/070-E, 6 May 1996, available at http://www.icty.org/
en/press/tribunals-first-trial-another-step-fulfillment-tribunals-mandate (last visited 10 
December 2018). 
67  G. Kirk McDonald, ‘Address to the United Nations General Assembly by Judge Gabrielle 
Kirk McDonald, President of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia’, JL/P.I.S./445-E, 8 November 1999, available at http://www.icty.org/en/
press/address-united-nations-general-assembly-judge-gabrielle-kirk-mcdonald-president-
international (last visited 10 December 2018).
68  Cf. Prosecutor v. Stanković, Referral Bench, supra note 63, para. 46.
69  Cf. ibid., para. 32. The exact same wording is also used in Prosecutor v. Rašević and 
Todović, Decision, Referral Bench, IT-97-25/1-PT, 8 July 2005, para. 34 [Prosecutor v. 
Rašević and Todović, Referral Bench]; Prosecutor v. Mejakić, Gruban, Fuštar, Knežević, 
Decision, Referral Bench, IT-02-65-PT, 20 July 2005, para. 43 [Prosecutor v. Mejakić, 
et al., Referral Bench]; Prosecutor v. Janković, Decision, Referral Bench, IT-96-23/2-PT, 
22 July 2005, para. 27 [Prosecutor v. Janković, Referral Bench]; Prosecutor v. Ljubičić, 
Decision, Referral Bench, IT-00-41-PT, 12 April 2006, para. 31 [Prosecutor v. Ljubičić, 
Referral Bench]; Prosecutor v. Kovačević, Decision, Referral Bench, IT-01-42/2-I, 17 
November 2006, para. 25 [Prosecutor v. Kovačević, Referral Bench]; Prosecutor v. Milan 
Lukić and Sredoje Lukić, Decision, Referral Bench, IT-98-32/1-PT, 5 April 2007, para. 45 
[Prosecutor v. Milan Lukić and Sredoje Lukić, Referral Bench].
70  Focus on the conduct means that it is not necessarily required that a particular offence is 
conceptualized as an international crime. It is sufficient that the conduct is covered by the 
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however, that the legality principle, especially its components nullum crimen- and 
nulla poena sine lege were respected and that no one was convicted or punished 
upon law that was not applicable at the time of the offence.71
In addition, the ICTY underlined the importance to have those modes 
of liability available that most accurately mirror the respective responsibility of 
accused in international crimes trials.72 Most prominently, this concerned the 
notion of command responsibility as established in Article 7 (3) ICTY Statute.73
Lastly, it was necessary that an appropriate punishment was available. For 
international crimes trials, appropriate punishment would often entail a prison 
sentence,74 but the Tribunal did not specify the proper length of sentences. 
Also concerning sanctions, the ICTY welcomed that the legality principle is 
cherished, this time the principle of lex mitior (that in the case of changes in the 
laws between the commission of the offence and its adjudication, the law that is 
more lenient to the accused shall be applied). It should, however, not impede the 
trial and punishment of a defendant.75
2. Human Rights
Publicly, the ICTY has always maintained that human rights need to be 
ensured at the domestic level.76 Although this referred to all human rights as 
enshrined in the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) (including 
those that are not directly linked to prosecutions of international crimes, such 
as freedom of expression)77, the focus naturally was on whether the criminal 
law, whether as an ordinary crime or as an international crime.
71  Cf. Prosecutor v. Janković, Referral Bench, supra note 69, para. 40-41; Prosecutor v. Milan 
Lukić and Sredoje Lukić, Referral Bench, supra note 69, para. 55.
72  Cf. Jorda, ‘Report on the Judicial Status of the ICTY’, supra note 33, 19. 
73  Cf. Prosecutor v. Kovačević, Referral Bench, supra note 69, para. 43-47; Prosecutor 
v. Rašević and Todović, Referral Bench, supra note 69, para. 51; Prosecutor v. Ljubičić, 
Referral Bench, supra note 69, para. 34-35.
74  Cf. Prosecutor v. Stanković, Referral Bench, supra note 63, para. 40 and 43.
75  Cf. Prosecutor v. Milan Lukić and Sredoje Lukić, Referral Bench, supra note 69, para. 55.
76  Cf. T. Meron, ‘Address of Judge Theodor Meron, President of the ICTY, to the UN 
General Assembly’, JP/ P.I.S/912-e, 15 November 2004, available at http://www.icty.
org/en/press/address-judge-theodor-meron-president-icty-un-general-assembly-15-
november-2004 (last visited 10 December 2018); T. Meron, ‘Statement by President 
Meron on the occasion of International Justice Day’, 16 July 2015, available at http://
www.icty.org/en/press/statement-president-meron-occasion-international-justice-day 
(last visited 10 December 2018); in the figures, this element is called “human rights”.
77  Cf. G. Krik McDonald, ‘Statement by Judge Mcdonald, President of the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia’, JL/PIU/359-E, 5 November 1998, available 
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procedural law of a country would be human rights conform.78 An evaluation of 
whether the human rights of the defendant are respected if a case is handed over 
to the national level has occupied a prominent place in all referral cases, and in 
the time period of referrals, the Tribunal frequently recalled the importance of 
respecting fair trial rights (see figure 3 above). In Rule 11bis case law, different 
aspects were emphasized, depending on the specific characteristics of the case. 
Most importantly, the Tribunal needed to be assured that the accused would 
not face the death penalty and that s/he would receive a fair trial79 – but also 
that national law provided for decent detention conditions. In that respect, the 
Tribunal welcomed accession to the ECHR and the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) as this would constitute an additional layer 
of protection of fair trial rights, next to possible national constitutional law 
provisions or safeguards provided for in national criminal law.80 Lastly, the ICTY 
stressed that the domestic legal framework must ensure victims and witness 
support and protection,81 as well as the integrity of confidential materials.82 
In Stanković, the Referral Bench laid out a list of minimum fair trial 
rights which largely replicated Article 21 ICTY Statute – which in itself is a 
reproduction of fair trial rights as recognized by Article 14 ICCPR from 1966 
and by Article 6 of the ECHR.83 
at http://www.icty.org/en/press/statement-judge-mcdonald-president-international-
criminal-tribunal-former-yugoslavia (last visited 10 December 2018).
78  In the figures, this element is called “fair trial rights”.
79  This is required by Rule 11bis (B), supra note 32.
80  Cf. Prosecutor v. Mejakić, et al., Referral Bench, supra note 69, para. 69 and 79; Prosecutor 
v. Milan Lukić and Sredoje Lukić, Referral Bench, supra note 69, para. 74.
81  In the figures, this element is called “victims- and witness protection”, and “victims 
rights” when statements refer to their right to compensation.
82  Cf. ICTY, ‘Vojislav Šešelj Charged with Contempt of Court’, Press Release. NJ/
MOW/1300e, 22 January 2009, available at http://www.icty.org/en/press/vojislav-šešelj-
charged-contempt-court (last visited 10 December 2018); ICTY, Completion Strategy 
Report November 2007, UN Doc S/2007/663, 12 November 2007, 10, available at http://
www.icty.org/x/file/About/Reports%20and%20Publications/CompletionStrategy/
completion_strategy_12november2007_en.pdf (last visited 10 December 2018) [ICTY, 
Completion Strategy Report November 2007]; in the figures, this element is called 
“integrity of confidential material”.
83  Cf. Prosecutor v. Stanković, Referral Bench, supra note 63, para. 55; this list was reiterated 
in Prosecutor v. Kovačević, Referral Bench, supra note 69, para. 68; Prosecutor v. Rašević 
and Savo Todović, Referral Bench, supra note 69, para. 72; Prosecutor v. Mejakić, et al., 
Referral Bench, supra note 69, para. 68; Prosecutor v. Janković, Referral Bench, supra note 
69, para. 62; Prosecutor v. Milan Lukić and Sredoje Lukić, Referral Bench, supra note 69, 
para. 71.
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Firstly, all persons are equal before the court.84 In the Balkan context, 
this especially referred to equality regardless of ethnic or religious background.85 
Secondly, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing by a competent, 
independent and impartial tribunal established by law.86 This not only signifies 
that due process standards must be respected,87 but also that several institutional 
safeguards need to be provided in order to in fact ensure a fair trial.88 The third 
right entails the presumption of innocence until proven guilty according to 
the law.89 Fourthly, the accused has the right to be informed promptly and in 
detail in a language which s/he understands of the nature and cause of the 
charge against him.90 During trial, the accused has the right to free assistance 
of an interpreter if s/he cannot understand or speak the language used in the 
proceedings.91 
Fifthly, the accused’s right to a defense comprises different elements that 
the Tribunal distinguished but that are somewhat related: first, it contains the 
right of an accused to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of 
his/her defense and to communicate with counsel of his/her own choosing; 
second, the right to be tried in his/her presence, and to defend him/herself in 
person or through legal assistance of his own choosing; and third, the right to 
be informed, if s/he does not have legal assistance, of this right, and to have 
legal assistance assigned to him/her, in any case where the interests of justice 
so require, and without payment by him/her in any such case if s/he does not 
84  Cf. Prosecutor v. Stanković, Referral Bench, supra note 63, para. 55.
85  Cf. ICTY, ‘Joint Press Statement Visit to The Hague by Delegation from Republika 
Srpska’, Press Release, CC/PIO/101-E, 31 July 1996, available at http://www.icty.org/
en/press/joint-press-statement-visit-hague-delegation-republika-srpska (last visited 10 
December 2018).
86  Cf. Prosecutor v. Stanković, Referral Bench, supra note 63, para. 55; ICTY, ‘Trial Chamber 
II Hands Down its Decision on the Subpoena Issue: The Subpoena Duces Tecum Issued 
to Croatia and its Defence Minister in January 1997 Must be Complied with by 18 
August 1997’, Press Release, CC/PIO/230-E, 18 July 1997, available at http://www.icty.
org/en/press/trial-chamber-ii-hands-down-its-decision-subpoena-issue-subpoena-duces-
tecum-issued-croatia (last visited 10 December 2018) [ICTY, Press Release 18 July 1997]; 
Burke-White, ‘The Domestic Influence’, supra note 63, 323.
87  Cf. T. Meron, ‘Address of Judge Theodor Meron, President of the ICTY, to the UN 
Security Council’, TM/P.I.S./916-e, 23 November 2004, available at http://www.icty.
org/en/press/address-judge-theodor-meron-president-icty-un-security-council (last visited 
10 December 2018). 
88  This will be elaborated further down under “Institutional Dimension”.
89  Cf. Prosecutor v. Stanković, Referral Bench, supra note 63, para. 55.
90  Cf. ibid.
91  Cf. ibid.
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have sufficient means to pay for it.92 It is accepted by the ICTY that the right 
to counsel of one’s own choosing is not without limitation: it extends only to 
counsel who are entitled to appear before the respective court of trial and the 
accused must make his/her choice accordingly. In addition, it is also acceptable 
that in case the accused cannot pay for the counsel, s/he may choose from a list 
of available defense counsel – and if s/he doesn’t, a counsel will be appointed by 
the court.93 
The sixth fair trial right, the right to an expeditious trial,94 grants the 
accused the right to be tried without undue delay.95 Any possible delay in 
proceedings must not be undue, unreasonable or unnecessary.96 It is accepted 
that a system that grants an accused the right to be brought before the court 
in the shortest reasonable time period and to be tried without delay and that 
requires that the duration of custody is reduced to the shortest time necessary, is 
in accordance with the right to an expeditious trial. In addition, it was lauded if 
incentives exist under the law to proceed without undue delay.97
Seventhly, an accused has the right to examine, or have examined, the 
witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses 
on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him.98 The Referral 
Bench indirectly related the issue of witness protection to the right of the accused 
to examine witnesses, as it may “promot[e] witness presence at trial by providing 
assurance to witnesses that legal measures exist for their protection.”99 Measures 
provided for in the laws of Bosnia and Herzegovina were deemed sufficient in this 
respect: in criminal proceedings, both parties may request an order for protective 
measures, such as anonymity of a witness or the use of a pseudonym both, 
inside and outside of court. The Witness Protection Programme Law of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina regulates possible measures to take outside the courtroom, 
92  Cf. ibid.
93  Cf. Prosecutor v. Rašević and Todović, Referral Bench, supra note 69, para. 88; Prosecutor 
v. Mejakić, et al., Referral Bench, supra note 69, para. 111; Prosecutor v. Janković, Referral 
Bench, supra note 69, para. 77.
94  Cf. ICTY, Press Release 18 July 1997, supra note 86. 
95  Cf. Prosecutor v. Stanković, Referral Bench, supra note 63, para. 55; ICTY, Annual Report 
2012, A/67/214–S/2012/592, 1 August 2012, 17, available at http://www.icty.org/x/file/
About/Reports%20and%20Publications/AnnualReports/annual_report_2012_en.pdf 
(last visited 10 December 2018).
96  Cf. Prosecutor v. Stanković, Referral Bench, supra note 63, para. 77.
97  Cf. Prosecutor v. Rašević and Todović, Referral Bench, supra note 69, paras. 96, 102.
98  Cf. Prosecutor v. Stanković, Referral Bench, supra note 63, para. 55.
99  Ibid., para. 89.
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such as change of identity or issuance of cover documents.100 Likewise, the 
Serbian Law on Protection of Participants in Criminal Proceedings – which 
is applicable to witnesses – provides for a protection program which can apply 
measures including physical protection of persons and property, change of place 
of residence, or the concealing or change of identity.101 This was also conceived 
as sufficient.102 While ICTY representatives repeatedly recalled the necessity of 
adequate victim and witness protection, the Appeals Chamber acknowledged in 
Janković103 that “no judicial system, be it national or international, can guarantee 
absolute witness protection.”104 At the same time, the protection of witnesses 
can be somewhat detrimental to the right of the accused to properly defend 
him/herself as s/he might need to know who is testifying against him/her. In 
this respect, the Referral Bench welcomed certain safeguards so that “a proper 
balance will be struck between the rights of an accused and the need to protect 
vulnerable witnesses and witnesses under threat.”105 Thus, the application of 
protective measures must be carefully considered beforehand and only ordered 
after taking into account the views of the defense, and “sufficient details” should 
be released to the accused for him/her to prepare his/her defense.106 In addition, 
in any case, the accused must be in the position to examine the protected witness 
by asking questions.107
As the eighth right enshrines the right not to incriminate oneself, the 
accused shall not be compelled to testify against him/herself or to confess guilt.108
Lastly, and although not mentioned in Article 21 ICTY Statute or in the 
list of fair trial rights the Referral Bench had reiterated since Stanković, the right 
not to stand trial in case of physical or mental unfitness was examined as a “fair 
trial consideration[…]”109 in Kovačević.110
According to Rule 11bis (B), a case could only be referred if the death 
penalty would not be imposed or carried out. Case law has clarified that through 
the ratification of Protocol 13 of ECHR, which abolished the death penalty in 
100  Cf. ibid.; Prosecutor v. Mejakić, et al., Referral Bench, supra note 69, paras. 105, 106.
101  Cf. Prosecutor v. Kovačević, Referral Bench, supra note 69, para. 84.
102  Cf. ibid., para. 86.
103  And reiterated Prosecutor v. Rašević and Todović, Referral Bench, supra note 69, para. 65.
104  Prosecutor v. Janković, Referral Bench, supra note 69, para. 49.
105  Prosecutor v. Rašević and Todović, Referral Bench, supra note 69, para. 91.
106  Cf. Prosecutor v. Mejakić, et al., Referral Bench, supra note 69, para. 100.
107  Cf. ibid., para. 101.
108  Cf. Prosecutor v. Stanković, Referral Bench, supra note 63, para. 55.
109  Prosecutor v. Kovačević, Referral Bench, supra note 69, para. 50.
110  Cf. ibid.
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all circumstances, this condition is fulfilled. That holds true even if national law 
applicable at the time of the offence foresaw the death penalty as punishment, 
since Protocol 13 would nonetheless preclude its imposition.111
In addition to these rights, the ICTY held that adequate detention 
“touches upon the fairness of [a] jurisdiction’s criminal justice system.”112 There 
must be decent detention facilities for remand and convicted persons,113 where 
their rights are respected by those responsible for detention pre-trial, during 
trial, and post-trial,114 and where detainees are treated equally, no matter their 
nationality, political views, or religious beliefs.115 Also the length of detention 
during pre-trial and trial periods must be adequate.116
II. Institutional Dimension
Clearly, the ICTY’s focus within the normative dimension of the rule 
of law is that a legislative framework exists that enables the prosecution and 
processing of international crimes, while effectively ensuring human rights, 
especially fair trial rights. However, as mentioned, this is not enough. The rule 
of law is only guaranteed if institutions exist that are capable of carrying out 
such proceedings. For that, in the ICTY’s view, judicial institutions must be 
independent117 and impartial, and – most importantly – legal practitioners, 
including judges, prosecutors, support staff, and defense counsel must be well-
trained and competent.118 These elements have been stressed a lot as of the 
moment that referrals of cases from the ICTY to the national judiciaries of the 
111  Cf. Prosecutor v. Stanković, Referral Bench, supra note 63, para. 55; Prosecutor v. Rašević 
and Todović, Referral Bench, supra note 69, para. 56; Prosecutor v. Mejakić, et al., Referral 
Bench, supra note 69, para. 66, 67; Prosecutor v. Janković, Referral Bench, supra note 
69, paras. 47, 48; Prosecutor v. Ljubičić, Referral Bench, supra note 69, paras. 38, 39; 
Prosecutor v. Milan Lukić and Sredoje Lukić, Referral Bench, supra note 69, para. 62.
112  Prosecutor v. Stanković, Appeals Chamber, supra note 38, para. 34; in the figures, this 
element is called “adequate detention”.
113  Cf ICTY, Prosecutor v. Janković, Appeals Chamber, Decision, IT-96-23/2-PT, 15 
November 2005, paras. 69-76 [ICTY, Prosecutor v. Janković, Appeals Chamber]; ICTY, 
Completion Strategy Report November 2007, supra note 82, 11.
114  Cf. Prosecutor v. Janković, Appeals Chamber, supra note 113, paras. 69-76.
115  Cf. Jorda, ‘Report on the Judicial Status of the ICTY’, supra note 33, 25.
116  Cf. Prosecutor v. Mejakić, et al., Referral Bench, supra note 69, para. 109; that the law 
of Bosnia and Herzegovina provided that the maximum period of pre-trial and trial 
detention does not exceed 1.5 years was mentioned as particularly suspect- and accused-
friendly.
117  In the figures, this element is called “independence of the judiciary”.
118  In the figures, this element is called “competence of the judiciary”.
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former Yugoslavia became a possibility (see figure 4 below).119 Of course, these 
countries needed to be prepared to process these cases, and at the ICTY, one 
was most preoccupied due to possible lacks of independence and competence 
of the national judiciaries. In reaction, in an endeavor to support the national 
judiciaries (especially in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, and Serbia) which all 
had set up specialized institutions for the prosecution and trial of international 
crimes, and whose work had been kicked off with the referred Rule 11bis cases, 
the ICTY engaged in enhanced capacity building, in particular between 2005 
and 2011. This rule of law promotion effort will be further presented in section 
D.II. below. 
Figure 4
For the Tribunal, independence of a judicial system120 first and foremost 
refers to the absence of anything that is not judicial, but political: the system as 
119  As explained, this was first envisaged within the completion strategy in 2003.
120  Cf. Prosecutor v. Stanković, Referral Bench, supra note 63, para. 55; ICTY, Press Release 
18 July 1997, supra note 86; ICTY, Digest 58, 2, available at http://www.icty.org/x/
file/About/Reports%20and%20Publications/ICTYDigest/icty_digest_58_en.pdf (last 
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such must not be politicized,121 political authorities should not be able to interfere 
in investigations,122 and trials should not be used for political purposes,123 or 
“pleas[e] political pressure”124.
A judicial system, especially courts, also need to be impartial. Although 
impartiality has not directly been defined by the Tribunal, it entails several 
principles: firstly, in order to ensure the integrity of judges, i.e. that they are 
not corrupt, they must be “sufficiently remunerated and their independence 
guaranteed.”125 Secondly, a balanced composition of courts, particularly in 
ethnic terms, is helpful.126 Impartiality heavily depends on appropriate selection 
standards and procedures for judicial personnel,127 and on the availability of 
possibilities to disqualify a judge for lack of impartiality.128
Next to independence and impartiality, the ICTY also repeatedly 
highlighted judicial transparency,129 efficiency and effectiveness,130 and 
competence131 as principles within the intuitional dimension of the rule of law. To 
visited at 10 December 2018); ICTY, Annual Report 2009, A/64/205–S/2009/394, 31 
July 2009, 8, para. 16, available at http://www.icty.org/x/file/About/Reports%20and%20
Publications/AnnualReports/annual_report_2009_en.pdf (last visited 10 December 
2018); ICTY, ‘Paddy Ashdown and Carla Del Ponte Call for BiH Parliament to Make 
War Crimes Chamber Operational by January 2005’, Press Release, FH/P.I.S./903-e, 
20 October 2004, available at http://www.icty.org/en/press/paddy-ashdown-and-carla-
del-ponte-call-bih-parliament-make-war-crimes-chamber-operational (last visited 10 
December 2018).
121  Cf. Jorda, ‘Report on the Judicial Status of the ICTY’, supra note 33, 19.
122  Cf. ibid., 25.
123  Cf. ICTY, Completion Strategy Report November 2004, supra note 47, 3.
124  ICTY, Completion Strategy Report May 2008, S/2008/326, 14 May 2008, 11, 
available at http://www.icty.org/x/file/About/Reports%20and%20Publications/
CompletionStrategy/completion_strategy_14may2008_en.pdf (last visited 10 December 
2018).
125  Jorda, ‘Report on the Judicial Status of the ICTY’, supra note 33, 25, fn. 24.
126  Cf. Jorda, ibid., 19.
127  Cf. Prosecutor v. Stanković, Referral Bench, supra note 63, paras. 27-30; Prosecutor v. 
Janković, Appeals Chamber, supra note 113, para. 53.
128  Cf. Prosecutor v. Mejakić, et al., Referral Bench, supra note 69, para. 86.
129  Cf. ICTY, Digest 63, 14 September 2009, 1, available at http://www.icty.org/x/file/About/
Reports%20and%20Publications/ICTYDigest/icty_digest_63_en.pdf (last visited 10 
December 2018); in the figures, this element is called “transparency of the judiciary”.
130  Cf. ICTY, Completion Strategy Report November 2007, supra note 82, 10; in the figures, 
this element is called “effectiveness and efficiency”.
131  Cf. Jorda, ‘Report on the Judicial Status of the ICTY’, supra note 33, 19; ICTY, Digest 
52, supra note 61, 1; ICTY, Completion Strategy Report November 2009, supra note 28, 21; 
Burke-White, ‘The Domestic Influence’, supra note 63, 323.
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ensure efficiency, sufficient financial and logistical resources are paramount.132 To 
ensure effectiveness, the Tribunal demanded international and regional judicial 
cooperation,133 which requires not only an adequate legal framework for the 
transfer of suspects and accused, evidence, or proceedings, but also compliance 
with relevant request.134 Lastly, to ensure competence, members of the justice 
system need to be well selected and well trained in conducting the relevant 
investigations and judicial proceedings,135 including war crimes proceedings.136
III. Cultural Dimension
Apart from principles that relate to the functioning of the institutional 
set-up of a national justice system, a legal culture is indispensable for the rule of 
law to be properly anchored in a society. A “culture of law instead of violence”137, 
and an “ideology of legality”138 should govern societies. This relates to everyone, 
including ordinary citizens. But the ICTY of course also stressed the particular 
necessity for justice institutions that “entrench the rule of law”139 and that are an 
132  Cf. Jorda, ‘Report on the Judicial Status of the ICTY’, supra note 33, 19.
133  Cf. ICTY, Annual Report 2011, A/66/210–S/2011/473, 31 July 2011, 15, available at 
http://www.icty.org/x/file/About/Reports%20and%20Publications/AnnualReports/
annual_report_2011_en.pdf (last visited 10 December 2018); in the figures, this element 
is called “regional and international cooperation”.
134  Cf. ICTY OTP, Completion Strategy Report May 2012, S/2012/354, 23 May 2012, 
34, available at http://www.icty.org/x/file/About/Reports%20and%20Publications/
CompletionStrategy/completion_strategy_23may2012_en.pdf (last visited 10 December 
2018).
135  Cf. Jorda, ‘Report on the Judicial Status of the ICTY’, supra note 33, 19; ICTY, Completion 
Strategy Report November 2009, supra note 28, 21; Burke-White, ‘The Domestic Influence’, 
supra note 63, 323.
136  Cf. ICTY, Completion Strategy Report May 2014, S/2014/351, 16 May 2014, 7, 
available at http://www.icty.org/x/file/About/Reports%20and%20Publications/
CompletionStrategy/completion_strategy_16may2014_en.pdf (last visited 10 December 
2018); ICTY, Press Release 21 February 2013, supra note 64; ICTY, Annual Report 2005, 
supra note 64, 38.
137  C. del Ponte, ‘Address by the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunals for the 
former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, Mrs. Carla del Ponte, to the United Nations Security 
Council’, JJJ/P.I.S./709-e, 30 October 2002, available at http://www.icty.org/en/press/
address-prosecutor-international-criminal-tribunals-former-yugoslavia-and-rwanda-mrs-
carla-del (last visited 10 December 2018).
138  Meron, ‘Statement 9 March 2005’, supra note 16.
139  ICTY, ‘Tribunal President Welcomes Support for Bosnia and Herzegovina’s Judicial 
Institutions’, Press Release, CVO/MO/1059e, 31 March 2006, available at http://www.
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“articulation of shared values and moral imperatives”140.141 Thus, State organs, 
especially judicial institutions need to work in a fair142 manner and treat everyone 
equally, regardless of their ethnic or religious background.143
In order for citizens to develop faith in State institutions,144 respect for the 
judicial process,145 and trust in “judicial accountability”146,147 they need to be 
properly informed about the work of criminal justice institutions,148 especially 
about international criminal proceedings that address a country’s violent past.149 
The ICTY called for raising such awareness in the region, especially towards 
the end of its existence (see figure 5 below). But it also sought to contribute to 
it through its own outreach program, which was massively professionalized as 
of 2009. This particular rule of law promotion effort will be further elaborated 
upon in section D.III. below.
icty.org/en/press/tribunal-president-welcomes-support-bosnia-and-herzegovinas-judicial-
institutions (last visited 10 December 2018).
140  T. Meron, ‘Address to the U.N. Security Council’, 5 June 2014, 2, available at http://www.
icty.org/x/file/Press/Statements%20and%20Speeches/President/140605_president_
meron_un_sc_en.pdf (last visited 10 December 2018).
141  In the figures, these elements have been grouped together under “culture of law”.
142  Cf. G. Kirk McDonald, Prosecutor v. Tadić, Opening Statements, IT-94-1-T, 9, available 
at http://www.icty.org/x/cases/tadic/trans/en/960507IT.htm (last visited 10 December 
2018); Meron, ‘Address to the U.N. Security Council’, supra note 140, 2.
143  Cf. ICTY, Press Release 31 July 1996, supra note 85; in the figures, these elements have 
been grouped together under “fairness of the judiciary”.
144  Cf. Kirk McDonald, ‘Making a Difference or Making Excuses?’, supra note 59.
145  Cf. S. Brammertz, ‘Statement of the ICTY Prosecutor Serge Brammertz in Relation 
to the Gotovina and Markac Appeal Judgement’, 21 November 2012, 1, available at 
http://www.icty.org/x/file/Press/Statements%20and%20Speeches/Prosecutor/121121_
prosecutor_brammertz_en.pdf (last visited 10 December 2018).
146  S. Brammertz, ‘Address of Mr. Serge Brammertz, Prosecutor International Criminal 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and Mechanism for International Criminal Tribunals 
to the United Nations Security Council’, 8 December 2016, 3, available at http://www.
icty.org/x/file/Press/Statements%20and%20Speeches/Prosecutor/161208_prosecutor_
brammertz_un_sc_en.pdf (last visited 10 December 2018).
147  In the figures, these elements have been grouped together under “trust in state institutions”.
148  Cf. ICTY, Completion Strategy Report November 2009, supra note 28, 21. 
149  Cf. ICTY, ‘Support from European Union to the ICTY’, Press Release, LM/P.I.S./547-e, 
7 December 2000, available at http://www.icty.org/en/press/support-european-union-
icty (last visited 10 December 2018); in the figures, these elements have been grouped 
together under “awareness of accountability proceedings”.
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Figure 5
D. The ICTY’s Modest Rule of Law Promotion Efforts
Although the ICTY is a criminal court with the main purpose of 
prosecuting and trying perpetrators of international crimes, the Tribunal clearly 
saw its own work in a broader – rule of law enhancing – context. Representatives 
frequently claimed that the Tribunal contributed to the rule of law, either to 
the international rule of law through its role of enforcer of international 
humanitarian and criminal law, or to the national rule of law. When analyzing 
official statements and publications of the ICTY, one gets a grip on what is 
meant by the national rule of law, although no official definition exists. At least 
with the adoption of the completion strategy and insertion of Rule 11bis into 
the ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence, it is obvious that the Tribunal 
undertook steps to enhance the national rule of law in the countries under its 
jurisdiction. While Rule 11bis did not require the ICTY to make an active effort 
(rather, the burden to comply with the rule’s conditions for case referral is on 
the national justice systems), its existence nevertheless triggered a broad range 
of rule of law promotion activities, all geared towards preparing the national 
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systems to meet the required standards. By virtue of Rule 11bis the Tribunal 
assumed the role of the rule of law promoter in the region.
Although the initiatives were many, the three main ones will be briefly 
sketched out here:150 triggering national prosecutions and proceedings of 
international crimes, enhancing competence of national judiciaries, and raising 
awareness in order to build a culture of law. They directly relate to those 
elements that appear most frequently within each rule of law dimension (in the 
normative dimension, this element was conducting accountability proceedings 
for international crimes; in the institutional dimension, it was competence of the 
judiciary; and in the cultural dimension, this was awareness of accountability 
proceedings that address a country’s violent past) in official statements or 
publications. Therefore, while Rule 11bis was the legal trigger for the ICTY 
to engage in rule of law promotion, the notion of the national law it gradually 
developed informed the exact rule of law promotion steps to take.
I. Triggering Prosecutions: Building Institutions and Transferring 
 Cases and Material
With the UN Security Council’s call to strengthen the domestic justice 
systems in mind, the completion strategy and in particular, Rule 11bis prompted 
one of the most significant ICTY rule of law promotion initiatives: in order to 
trigger prosecutions in the region, the Tribunal lobbied the former Yugoslav 
countries to establish specialized institutions to prosecute and try perpetrators 
of international crimes, and advised them in this endeavor. The advantage of 
specialized institutions is mostly that they permit to concentrate resources 
and expertise,151 which is particularly necessary in the context of adjudicating 
international crimes. These trials are complex, both in terms of the underlying 
substantive law and in terms of procedure, which poses a specific set of challenges. 
Subsequently, it transferred to these institutions Rule 11bis cases, ready to be 
tried, as well as further evidentiary material, out of which additional cases could 
be built. These cases and evidentiary material were meant to kick off the work 
150  The focus will be on initiatives towards Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia, with BiH 
being the main target of the ICTY’s rule of law promotion efforts and Serbia being the 
least important target. To compare those two countries hence gives an idea about the 
range of activities and their impact.
151  On advantages of specialized institutions and the Serbian experience, see M. Majić & 
D. Ignatović, ‘Deset smerica zasnovanih na iskustvu Srbije vezanom za pitanja ratnih 
zločina’, 9 FICHL Policy Brief Series (2012).
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of the specialized institutions, with the help and under supervision of the ICTY 
Office of the Prosecutor.
In 2002, the State Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina (SCBiH) was set up 
by a decision of the High Representative (OHR),152 the institution responsible 
for overseeing implementation of civilian aspects of the Dayton Peace Agreement 
ending the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina. At the same time, ICTY judges 
recommended the establishment of a specialized war crimes chamber within this 
court, staffed with both national and international judges.153 While until 2005, 
trials for war-related crimes had been held only in the courts of the entities, 
the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republika Srpska, the most 
complex war crimes cases now take place within the new war crimes department 
at the State Court of BiH.154 The corresponding BiH State Prosecutor’s Office was 
established in January 2003,155 and since March 2005 it also includes a special 
department for war crimes.156 Overall, local actors report an overwhelming 
involvement of the ICTY in the establishment of these war crimes institutions in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina. In fact, the war crimes department was set up upon an 
agreement between and as a “joint initiative”157 of the OHR and the Tribunal. 
In addition, ICTY officials performed an important role with regard to the 
152  Cf. Office of the High Representative, Decision Establishing the BiH State Court, 12 
November 2000; the Law on the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina had later been 
adopted by the two chambers of the BiH parliament as well; see: Sud Bosne i Herzegovine, 
‘Istorijat Suda BiH’, supra note 44. 
153  Cf. Jorda, ‘Report on the Judicial Status of the ICTY’, supra note 33, 25.
154  Cf. Y. Ronen, ‘The Impact of the ICTY on Atrocity-Related Prosecutions in the Courts 
of Bosnia and Herzegovina’, 3 Penn State Journal of Law and International Affairs (2014) 
1, 113, 124; see also: Government of BiH, ‘Državna Strategija za Rad na Predmetima 
Ratnih Zločina’ (National War Crimes Strategy), December 2008, 11-12, available at 
http://www.mpr.gov.ba/web_dokumenti/Drzavna%20strategije%20za%20rad%20
na%20predmetima%20RZ.pdf (last visited 10 December 2018).
155  It was established by the Law on the Prosecutor’s Office of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
enacted by the High Representative in August 2002, and adopted by the Bosnian 
parliament in October 2003. The Law is published in the Official Gazette of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, No 42/03.
156  Article 12 (3) Law on the Prosecutor’s Office of Bosnia and Herzegovina; for more 
information, see the Prosecution Service’s website: http://www.tuzilastvobih.gov.
ba/?opcija=sadrzaj&kat=1&id=2&jezik=e (last visited 10 December 2018).
157  United Nations Security Council, ‘Security Council Briefed on Establishment of War 
Crimes Chamber Within State Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina’, Press Release, 
SC/7888, 8 October 2003, available at http://www.un.org/press/en/2003/sc7888.doc.
htm (last visited 10 December 2018).
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future work of the new court,158 most importantly in preparing the SCBiH 
for receiving cases from The Hague.159 In that regard, the Tribunal not only 
provided expertise in establishing these institutions, but also exerted pressure as 
it needed to make sure that there are domestic institutions equipped of receiving 
Rule 11bis cases.160
In Serbia, only a limited number of war crimes trials had taken place 
between 1991 and 2003. The serious concerns as to the proper conduct and 
fairness of these trials161 considerably diminished with the establishment of 
specialized organs within the judicial system in 2003.162 With the Law on War 
Crimes,163 specialized institutions – the War Crimes Prosecutor’s Office, the 
War Crimes Department within the Belgrade High Court, and the War Crimes 
Investigation Service within the Police – were established.164 Contrary to the 
situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, in Serbia the establishment of specialized 
institutions were not instigated or brought about directly by the ICTY, but rather 
by regime change and external coercion.165 However, prominent ICTY staff 
members participated in the expert group that assisted the Serbian government 
in the drafting of the Law on War Crimes, and their recommendations to 
establish specialized war crimes institutions were implemented.166
158  Cf. Burke-White, ‘The Domestic Influence’, supra note 63, 336.
159  Cf. ICTY, Completion Strategy Report November 2004, supra note 47, 4.
160  Cf. Burke-White, ‘The Domestic Influence’, supra note 63, 335-344; interview with a 
representative of the Office of the High Representative, Sarajevo, 8 February 2017.
161  Cf. OSCE, War Crimes Proceedings in Serbia (2003-2014) - An analysis of the OSCE 
Mission to Serbia’s monitoring results (2015), 21.
162  Cf. K. Michaeli, The Impact of the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia on War 
Crime Investigations and Prosecutions in Serbia (2011), 59.
163  The Law on Organization and Competences of Government Authorities in War Crimes 
Proceedings, Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia, No 67/2003, and subsequent 
amendments.
164  For more information on the war crimes prosecution office, see: http://www.tuzilastvorz.
org.rs/sr/ (last visited 10 December 2018), and on the war crimes department, see: http://
www.bg.vi.sud.rs/lt/articles/o-visem-sudu/uredjenje/sudska-odeljenja/ (last visited 10 
December 2018).
165  Cf. Michaeli, ‘The Impact of the ICTY in Serbia’, supra note 162, 59; coercion was 
exerted most notably through the European Union with its conditionality policy. I have 
elaborated on the EU’s conditionality policy elsewhere: K.-H. Brodersen, ‘The ICTY’s 
Conditionality Dilemma’, 22 European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal 
Justice (2014) 3, 219.
166  Cf. L. Rüedi, War Crimes Trials in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Selected Aspects of Transitional 
Justice Mechanisms (2015), 86.
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In the following, the ICTY transferred eight Rule 11bis cases involving 
13 accused to the countries of the former Yugoslavia:167 ten to Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, two to Croatia, and one to Serbia.168 In addition, the Tribunal 
has provided professional advice on reforming relevant legislation, especially in 
areas such as command responsibility and witness protection, so that these cases 
could be properly adjudicated.169 
The calculation was that Rule 11bis cases would be a “catalyst for the 
strengthening of competent national judicial systems”170 and that once they 
would be completed successfully, prosecutions and trials for international 
crimes would become the norm.171 Opinions about the success of this rule of 
law promotion initiative are split, with the ICTY viewing it as very positive,172 
and while in Bosnia and Herzegovina some actors agree,173 other are more 
skeptical.174 The ICTY especially emphasized that the threat of taking back the 
167  Cf. ICTY, Transfer of Cases, available at http://www.icty.org/en/cases/transfer-cases (last 
visited 10 December 2018).
168  Although Serbia strived for receiving cases from the ICTY (cf. Michaeli, ‘The Impact 
of the ICTY in Serbia’, supra note 162, 67), only one case was referred to Serbia under 
Rule 11bis (cf. ICTY, ‘Vladimir Kovacevic Declared Unfit to Stand Trial’, Press Release, 
OK/MOW/1069e, 12 April 2006, available at http://www.icty.org/en/press/vladimir-
kovacevic-declared-unfit-stand-trial (last visited 10 December 2018)). While the Bench 
declared it was satisfied that the Serbian legal system met the fair trial requirement, the 
fact that the Kovačević case was the only one referred to Serbia was not a source of pride 
considering the opposite conclusion reached by the Bench one year prior: in the Mrkšić 
case (the Vukovar Three case), Serbia’s bid for referral was rejected (just as Croatia’s) by 
the Referral Bench on the grounds of fair trial concerns (cf. ICTY, Prosecutor v. Mrkšić, 
Radić, Šljivančanin, ‘Decision on Prosecutor’s Motion to Withdraw Motion and Request 
for Referral of Indictment under Rule 11bis’, IT-95-13/1-PT, Referral Bench, 30 June 
2005). Serbia was also denied referral of the Mejakić case in April 2006, albeit on grounds 
that BiH possessed a stronger nexus with the case; cf. ICTY, Prosecutor v. Mejakić, 
Decision on Joint Defense Appeal against Decision on Referral under Rule 11bis, IT-02-
65, Referral Bench, 7 April 2006.
169  Cf. ICTY, ‘Completion Strategy’, supra note 13.
170  Ibid.
171  Interview with a former international prosecutor in the Bosnian State Prosecution, The 
Hague, 7 December 2016.
172  Interview with a representative of the ICTY Office of the Prosecutor, The Hague, 25 
November 2016; interview with an ICTY judge, The Hague, 2 December 2016.
173  Interview with a former international prosecutor in the Bosnian State Prosecution, The 
Hague, 7 December 2016; interview with a prosecutor of the Bosnian State Prosecution, 
Sarajevo, 9 February 2017; interview with a SCBiH judge, Sarajevo, 1 February 2017.
174  Interview with a Bosnian defense counsel, Sarajevo, 31 January 2017; interview with a 
representative of an international organization, Sarajevo, 2 February 2017; in particular, 
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case if it is not dealt with properly – and the OSCE monitoring would provide 
proof for that – would have made national actors to be particularly cautious 
in handling these cases. In addition, Bosnians praise the tailor-made training 
provided by the OSCE, which directly addressed the needs of the local judiciary, 
which were observed and assembled in the OSCE’s trial monitoring of Rule 
11bis cases.175 However, what is for sure is that the international community, the 
ICTY included, was watching how Bosnia and Herzegovina dealt with the Rule 
11bis referrals. People who were involved at the time claim that everyone was 
therefore doing their very best to “do it right”.176
In addition to the referral cases, the OTP transferred evidentiary material 
to national judiciaries and granted them access to electronic databases and 
archives.177 In the first place, case files were transferred regarding suspects 
investigated by the OTP but where no indictments were ever issued. Here, 
national judiciaries were enabled to bring these investigations to a conclusion on 
the basis of the evidence received from the ICTY and to raise indictments where 
appropriate. In a second place, several mechanisms in view of collaboration on 
evidentiary issues were put in place.178 Similar to transferring ready-made Rule 
11bis cases, these initiatives had the aim of enabling domestic legal actors to 
they maintain that too few cases were referred, and the threat to revoke the referral was 
too unrealistic to actually make a difference.
175  Interview with representatives of an international organization, Sarajevo, 2 February 
2017; interview with a SCBiH judge, Sarajevo, 2 February 2017.
176  Interview with a former staff member of the Bosnian State Prosecution, 2 February 2017; 
interview with a former international prosecutor at the Bosnian State Prosecution, The 
Hague, 7 December 2017.
177  Cf. ICTY, ‘Completion Strategy’, supra note 13.
178  For instance, the OTP responds to specific requests from national prosecutors for 
information relating to their investigations; national liaison prosecutors sent to The 
Hague by the domestic judiciaries have direct access to the ICTY OTP databases and 
can directly use the material found there for investigations and prosecutions at national 
level; the ICTY is producing transcripts of its key proceedings in Bosnian, Croatian and 
Serbian (BCS) with the aim of improving the ability of national legal practitioners to 
access and search through testimony given before the ICTY for the purpose of their 
domestic proceedings; and also the Tribunal’s Appeals Chamber Case Law Research 
Tool, which contains a compilation of summaries of the most important Appeals 
Chamber decisions, is being translated into BCS. In addition, specially tailored trainings 
are provided to lawyers in the region in order to assist them in accessing the Tribunal’s 
records; cf. ICTY, Working with the Region, available at http://www.icty.org/en/about/
office-of-the-prosecutor/working-with-the-region (last visited 10 December 2018); ICTY, 
Capacity Building, available at http://www.icty.org/en/outreach/capacity-building (last 
visited 10 December 2018).
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initiate investigations and prosecutions on their own, but still be supported by 
the ICTY.
II. Enhancing Competence: Capacity Building
In light of serious concerns about the state of the judicial systems in the 
former Yugoslavia,179 in particular in terms of independence and competence, 
the 2002 ICTY completion strategy proposal already entailed recommendations 
about a number of reforms to be carried out in BiH. In particular, the judges 
advised incorporating all international crimes into the country’s substantive 
penal law, to strengthen fair trial rights,180 to improve detention conditions, to 
abolish the death penalty, to ensure the independence and impartiality of the 
judiciary, and to adopt a code of professional conduct for the judiciary.181
Despite this early engagement in advice on legal reform, capacity building 
had not been on the ICTY’s priority list for long. Interaction between ICTY 
judges and their local counterparts was very difficult in the beginning, especially 
with Serbia. Apart from the political conditions which made such interaction 
difficult, the mutual mistrust between the judiciaries and the prevailing opinion 
amongst ICTY judges that this was not part of the mandate of the Tribunal 
contributed to the professional disconnect between the two systems.182 In 2002, 
David Tolbert, former Senior Legal Adviser to the President of the ICTY, wrote 
about the ICTY’s failure to build domestic legal capacity as “catastrophic” since 
“outside the relatively small number of accused who have faced or will face trial 
in The Hague”, the local mechanisms “to bring to justice the scores of other 
perpetrators who committed serious violations of international humanitarian 
law in the territory of the former Yugoslavia”183 were ineffective. He deplored 
the irony of the “legacy of the rule of law”184 that the ICTY would leave behind: 
179  Cf. C. Jorda, ‘Report on the Judicial Status of the ICTY’, supra note 33.
180  In particular that public proceedings must be guaranteed, that the accused must be tried 
within a reasonable time, that the principle of the presumption of innocence and the 
equality of arms must be respected and that the victims and witnesses must be duly 
protected; cf. C. Jorda, ‘Report on the Judicial Status of the ICTY’, supra note 33, 25.
181  Cf. C. Jorda, ‘Report on the Judicial Status of the ICTY’, supra note 33, 18, 25.
182  Cf. Michaeli, ‘The Impact of the ICTY in Serbia’, supra note 162, 49-50.
183  D. Tolbert, ‘The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia: unforeseen 
Success and Foreseeable Shortcomings’, 26 The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs (2002) 2, 
7, 12.
184  V. Hussain, ‘Sustaining Judicial Rescues: The Role of Outreach and Capacity Building 
Efforts in War Crimes Tribunals’, 45 Virginia Journal of International Law (2005) 2, 547, 
562.
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despite the millions spent on building a judicial infrastructure in The Hague, 
virtually no effective enforcement of these laws persisted in the courts that 
ultimately matter most: the region’s domestic courts.185
As late as 2008, there was a shift in thinking with the Tribunal beginning 
to develop a program on its legacy which put special emphasis on enhancing the 
capacity of domestic systems in the region. Consequently, the Tribunal intensified 
the interaction with the local judiciaries, studied their needs and responded to 
them directly.186 Today, the ICTY describes supporting legal professionals and 
institutions in the region as a “key aspect of the Tribunal’s work”187. Since 2010, 
the ICTY Outreach Program is responsible for capacity building by organizing 
working visits, training seminars, workshops and other activities, in order for 
the Tribunal to transfer its expertise to local counterparts in a wide range of 
areas, ranging from legal jurisprudence to courtroom techniques and witness 
protection.188
Although over the years the ICTY managed to cultivate a positive working 
relationship with Serbian institutions entrusted with war crimes prosecutions,189 
contact between the ICTY and the Bosnian judiciary was much more regular 
and intensive than with actors from the Serbian judiciary.190 Amongst other 
reasons, this was due to the fact that most Rule 11bis cases had been referred to 
BiH and the ICTY consequently geared its capacity building efforts towards that 
country in order to address the shortcomings within the institutional dimension 
of the rule of law that were observed in the course of these local trials. In BiH, 
one can also observe greater impact:191 for instance, the State Court of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina regularly uses ICTY case law concerning the interpretation of 
185  Cf. Tolbert, ‘Unforeseen Success and Foreseeable Shortcomings’ supra note 183, 8.
186  Cf. Michaeli, ‘The Impact of the ICTY in Serbia’, supra note 162, 57; an overview on the 
activities can be found under ICTY, Overview of Capacity Building Activities, available 
at http://www.icty.org/en/outreach/capacity-building/overview-activities (last visited 10 
December 2018).
187  ICTY, Capacity Building, supra note 178.
188  Cf. ICTY, Overview of Capacity Building Activities, supra note 186.
189  Cf. Michaeli, ‘The Impact of the ICTY in Serbia’, supra note 162, 5. 
190  See, amongst others, the project’s calendar of activities under OSCE, War Crimes Justice 
Project – Calender of Activities, available at http://www.icty.org/x/file/Outreach/capacity_
building/wcjp_activity_calendar.pdf (last visited 10 December 2018).
191  For a critical review of capacity building initiatives in BiH, see A. Chehtman, ‘Developing 
Bosnia and Herzegovina’s Capacity to Process War Crimes Cases: Critical Notes on a 
‘Success Story’’, 9 Journal of International Criminal Justice (2011) 3, 547.
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different international crimes or modes of liability, or in order to fill gaps in their 
criminal procedure.192
III. Raising Awareness in order to Build a Culture of Law: Outreach 
 Program
As mentioned in section D.II. above, the beginning of the Tribunal’s work 
was marked by a virtual absence of contact between the local judiciaries and 
actors in The Hague. Likewise, in its early years, the ICTY was reluctant to 
communicate with the citizens of the former Yugoslavia about the objectives 
and goals of the Tribunal.193 Consequently, in the region, people sensed that 
the primary audience for the ICTY was the international community, that it 
mainly sought to further develop international humanitarian, human rights, 
and criminal law, and that it was rather an enforcer of the international rule of 
law,194 than contributing to the national rule of law. It was viewed as remote and 
disconnected from the population. That there was little information available 
about and from the ICTY (at least in local languages) was frequently used and 
abused for propaganda purposes by its opponents. And indeed, only when the 
ICTY realized how poorly it was perceived in the region and that this negative 
perception impacted its work, it began thinking about communicating with the 
local audience.195 ICTY President Gabrielle Kirk McDonald then initiated the 
Outreach Program in 1999, six years into the Tribunal’s existence. In hindsight, 
it is described as “a milestone in the Tribunal’s progression to maturity”196 
192  I have elaborated on this elsewhere: K.-H. Brodersen, ‘“We learnt that from The Hague” 
– How the ICTY influenced the fairness of criminal trials in the former Yugoslavia’, 
in C. Stahn et. al. (eds.), Legacies of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia: A Multidisciplinary Account (forthcoming 2019); while local actors both in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina as well as in Serbia appreciate the close collaboration with the 
ICTY, they do insist that initiatives from other partners, such as the OSCE, were more 
useful; interviews with national prosecutors (Belgrade, 19 January 2017 and Sarajevo, 9 
February 2017).
193  Cf. N. H. Pentelovitch, ‘Seeing Justice Done: The Importance of Prioritizing Outreach 
Efforts at International Criminal Tribunals’, 39 Georgetown Journal of International Law 
(2007) 3, 445, 451.
194  Cf. Hussain, ‘Sustaining Judicial Rescues’, supra note 184, 561-562.
195  Cf. S. Darehshori, ‘Lessons for Outreach from the Ad Hoc Tribunals, the Special Court 
for Sierra Leone, and the International Criminal Court’, 14 New England Journal of 
International and Comparative Law (2007) 2, 299, 301.
196  ICTY, Outreach Programme, available at http://www.icty.org/en/outreach/outreach-
programme (last visited 10 December 2018).
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and “a sign that the court had become deeply aware that its work would 
resonate far beyond the judicial mandate of deciding the guilt or innocence of 
individual accused.”197 With the establishment of Outreach, the Tribunal had 
recognized that it had a role to play in the process of dealing with the past in 
the former Yugoslavia, and that it could contribute to raising awareness about 
the accountability proceedings taking place in The Hague, and to spreading the 
truth that had been found in the course of these proceedings. 
The Outreach Program was therefore effectively designed as a massive 
public relations and information spreading initiative. It consisted of several 
components, with particular emphasis on reaching out to the youth.198 The first, 
and arguably the most important, step was to regularly translate ICTY materials 
into BCS, including the website. Also, live broadcasting of the proceedings on 
the internet commenced. Since 2000, offices had been opened in Belgrade, 
Pristina, Sarajevo and Zagreb, responsible for communicating with the media, 
the political, and the legal community, governmental and non-governmental 
organizations, universities and high schools, victims associations, and diplomatic 
representatives.199 According to the ICTY, thousands of people came into direct 
contact with the Tribunal through a variety of activities every year. These 
activities included work with the younger generation, grassroots communities, 
and the media; visits to the ICTY; and the production of a variety of information 
materials, multi-media website features, and social media outputs.200 At least as 
of the moment that all fugitives had been arrested in 2011, the Tribunal yet 
again enhanced and methodologically revised its outreach efforts, as it saw the 
“definitive opportunity to work with the communities in the region to reflect on 
the Tribunal’s achievements and carry that legacy forward.”201 
Arguably, although many observers feel that the effort was too limited in 
scope and came too late to have any real effect,202 through its outreach program 
197  Ibid.
198  For Youth Outreach, see http://www.icty.org/en/outreach/youth-outreach; for a list of 
activities, see http://www.icty.org/en/outreach/activities-archive; for the annual reports, 
see http://www.icty.org/en/outreach/outreach-annual-reports (all last visited 10 December 
2018). 
199  At the time of writing, only the offices in Belgrade and Sarajevo were still operating. 
200  Cf. ICTY, ‘Outreach Programme’, supra note 196.
201  Ibid.
202  Cf. Hussain, ‘Sustaining Judicial Rescues’, supra note 184, 563; Tolbert, ‘Unforeseen 
Success and Foreseeable Shortcomings’, supra note 183, 14.
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the ICTY contributed to “shrinking the space for denial”203 in the former 
Yugoslavia, which is the basis for a culture of law – the cultural dimension of the 
rule of law. In addition, thanks to lessons learned from the ICTY, outreach has 
now become a key component of international criminal justice.204 Many of its 
initiatives, especially accessible publications on the prosecutors’ investigations, 
the courts’ trial work and their procedures, as well as outreach to the youth has 
been taken up in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and even Serbia.205
E. Conclusion
The goal of the research this contribution is based on was to shed light on 
what made the ICTY engage in a promotion of the rule of law, what the ICTY 
understood by the ‘rule of law’, and how this understanding influenced its – very 
indirect – rule of law promotion efforts. The analysis presented here permits 
several conclusions. 
First, the discourse and document analyses reveal that the ICTY’s notion of 
the rule of law changed over time. Very early and very late references highlighted 
its role in promoting what has been termed the international rule of law. In 
between, the national rule of law was much more prominent in the ICTY’s 
discourse. Clearly, this shift in notions reflects the changing standing of the 
ICTY over time: in its early and late years it sought to justify its existence and 
underline its achievements and it did so by emphasizing its role as the enforcer 
of universal international criminal and humanitarian law. Around the 2000s 
and beyond, the completion strategy required the Tribunal to rethink its role, 
in particular because it realized that the domestic justice systems in the former 
Yugoslavia needed assistance in preparing for receiving Rule 11bis cases from 
The Hague. What followed was a range of measures aimed at contributing to 
the consolidation of the domestic justice systems in the region, which effectively 
rendered Rule 11bis the legal mechanism the ICTY’s rule of law promotion 
efforts were rooted in.
203  A phrase that became prominent with the book of Orentlicher, Shrinking the Space for 
Denial, supra note 5.
204  Cf. Darehshori, ‘Lessons for Outreach’, supra note 195, 299.
205  Interviews with national prosecutors (Belgrade, 19 January 2017 and Sarajevo, 9 February 
2017); although it should be noted that while the SCBiH publishes all its decisions 
and judgments online, the war crimes chamber at the Belgrade High Court has a very 
restrictive policy towards access to court materials: they are not available online and 
one must ask for permission to access them, which is given only concerning particularly 
mentioned judgments, which makes a comprehensive search impossible.
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The analysis further reveals that the ‘national rule of law’ as understood by 
the ICTY has a normative dimension, an institutional dimension, and a cultural 
dimension. In the normative dimension, emphasis was put on the necessity of a 
legislative framework that foresees the adjudication of international crimes and 
guarantees certain fundamental human rights, especially fair trial rights. This is 
the law that should rule. The institutional components of a justice system that 
ensure that it actually operates under the rule of law comprise independent and 
impartial judicial organs that work efficiently and in a fair, non-discriminatory, 
and transparent manner. Lastly, the ICTY recognized that a culture of 
law is paramount and that ordinary citizens, as well as public officials, and 
representatives of the judicial sector adopt an ideology of legality.
A third revelation is that within the ICTY’s notion of the ‘national rule 
of law’, its emphasis on different elements also changed over time. Mostly, this 
reflected the current challenges the Tribunal or the countries of the former 
Yugoslavia faced at the respective time. Interestingly, the Tribunal reacted to these 
events and adapted its rule of law promotion efforts accordingly. For instance, in 
the early 2000s emphasis was placed on the necessity to conduct national war 
crimes proceedings and to conduct them fairly and without discrimination. This 
related to the normative dimension of the Tribunal’s rule of law conception. 
It hence started to actively lobby and advise on the setting up of specialised 
domestic institutions that would deal with international crimes, and facilitated 
their start by transferring ready-made cases and other material. As of 2008, 
when the ICTY reflected upon the legacy it would leave behind, it enhanced 
its capacity building to strengthen domestic competence and efficiency to 
prosecute and adjudicate international crimes cases, as this was determined to be 
one of the major obstacles to successful international crimes trials in the former 
Yugoslavia. These initiatives sought to consolidate the institutional dimension of 
the rule of law. Around the same time, bearing in mind its impending closure, 
the ICTY called upon national judiciaries to raise awareness of international 
crimes trials such that the local population would develop trust that impunity 
is no longer accepted. It was hoped that this would strengthen the culture of 
law – the cultural dimension of the rule of law. In order to contribute to this 
awareness raising and to serve as an example for similar local initiatives, the 
Tribunal rendered its Outreach Program more robust.
It has been shown that the ICTY engaged in rule of law promotion on 
the basis of its completion strategy and, in particular, Rule 11bis of its Rules 
of Procedure and Evidence. Although these initiatives were not based on an 
explicitly expressed definition of the rule of law, a mosaic of elements the 
Tribunal associated with this concept emerges from its case law and public 
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statements. It was demonstrated that the Tribunal’s rule of law promotion 
efforts directly related to this rule of law conception. This piece, therefore, 
contributes to understanding the legal and normative bases of the ICTY’s rule 
of law strengthening efforts in the post-conflict former Yugoslavia.
